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Abstract 
Over the past thirty years, telecommunications markets the world over 
have begun liberalising, heralding a new era for both players and 
regulators. As developing country markets have started liberalising 
regulators have utilised policy tools, like local loop unbundling and price 
regulation, to aid this liberalisation. A debate has sprung up around 
whether these tools do what they intend, and whether they are relevant in 
developing markets. This study examines the potential impact of one such 
tool – local loop unbundling – on competition in one such market – South 
Africa. Based on this examination a framework is presented that 
policymakers in South Africa and other emerging markets can use when 
considering their own LLU implementations. The framework considers the 
type of competition desired and the rationale for the unbundling exercise, 
informed by the cost, complexity and control related to each specific type 
of unbundling, in order to guide policymakers and regulators in deciding on 
the form of unbundling most likely to result in a desired form of 
competition. 
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Glossary of terms 
Bitstream – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the incumbent gives 
entrants a wholesale xDSL product that they can resell to consumers – full 
control of the lines is retained by the incumbent (OECD, 2003: p7,8). 
 
Call termination rates – the rates operators charge each other to terminate 
calls on their networks. For example, if a customer of operator A makes a 
call to a customer of operator B, operator A has to pay operator B to 
terminate that call, and vice versa. 
 
Carrier pre-selection – a policy intervention that enables consumers to 
pre-select which carrier to carry a call, before that call is made, via their 
handset.  
 
CDMA-2000 – code division multiple access 2000. One of the CDMA 
family, used to provide high-speed, wireless Internet access.  
 
Colocation – where an operator's equipment is housed in a facility 
belonging to another operator or a neutral facility provider, for example, 
equipment housed by an entrant in an incumbent's exchange for the 
purposes of providing services to consumers via the incumbent's copper 
infrastructure. 
 
DSL – digital subscriber line. DSL is used to deliver high-speed broadband 
services, uses copper-line infrastructure and digital-enabled exchanges. 
xDSL refers to a variant of DSL like ADSL (asynchronous digital subscriber 
line) or HDSL (high bit-rate digital subscriber line). 
 
EDGE – enhanced data rates for GSM evolution. EDGE is a technology 
that allows the delivery of data over GSM networks. Also known as 
Enhanced GPRS or enhanced data for global evolution. 
 
Entrant – a company entering an industry. In this context, entering an 
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industry dominated by a monopoly incumbent. 
 
Exchange – the physical facility where telecommunications equipment 
connecting local copper loops to the provider's network and enabling calls 
to be routed and carried appropriately is housed. 
 
Fibre optic cable – fibre optic cables are strands of glass that carry data at 
high-speeds and are used for high bandwidth applications, like carrying 
data from continent to continent via the sea bed (undersea cables). 
 
Fixed line telephony – also known as POTS (plain old telephone system), 
fixed line telephony is a telephony service provided over fixed copper 
cable infrastructure.  
 
Facilities-based competition – eg. describes competition between 
providers of the same or similar, for example, telecoms services, where 
the service is delivered by different or proprietary means or networks. For 
example a broadband over powerline provider competing with a cable TV 
network to provide broadband Internet service is considered to be 
facilities-based competition. Also called infrastructure-based competition. 
(Webopedia) 
 
Full unbundling – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the incumbent's 
copper is leased to a new entrant to offer services over, and the incumbent 
ceases to provide services but still owns the infrastructure and has to 
maintain it (OECD, 2003: p7,8). 
 
HSPA+ – high-speed packet access plus. HSPA is a protocol used to 
deliver high-speed broadband over a mobile network.  
 
Incumbent – a monopoly provider of services in an industry, in this case 
telecommunications. Often put in place and subsidised by a country's 
government in an industry where it was thought it would not be feasible to 
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have more than one player (so called natural monopoly industries) like 
transport, utilities and such.  
 
Line sharing – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the new entrant is 
afforded access to some of the copper pair so, for example, the incumbent 
offers voice and the entrant offers broadband to the same consumer over 
the same (shared) line. (OECD, 2003: p7,8) 
 
Local loop unbundling – is a policy intervention intended to make the last 
mile of copper wire between a telecommunications exchange and a 
consumer available to telecommunications operators to offer services 
competing with those offered by the incumbent telecommunications 
company, which owns the infrastructure. 
 
LTE – long term evolution, a high-speed wireless broadband protocol, the 
successor to CDMA-2000. 
 
Mobile telephony – telephony provided wirelessly over various types of 
cellular telephone networks. 
 
Policy intervention – a plan of action designed to create a set outcome in a 
particular market, enacted by policymakers, usually government and/or 
regulatory bodies. 
 
Price squeeze – in this context, where last mile services where subsidised 
in the past and are thus provided at below cost by incumbents, and 
entrants coming into the market are obliged to pay the incumbent at cost 
to lease the local loop and thus rendered unable to deliver services to 
consumers at a lower price than the incumbent offers. 
 
Retail market – where providers sell services to end-consumers. 
 
Service-based competition – competition between providers where each 
13 
provides services using the same infrastructure, for example, where a 
local loop has been unbundled and the incumbent and entrant are both 
using copper wire to provide voice services, or, “when the entrant uses the 
facilities of the incumbent, competition is called service-based and can be 
realised either through resale or through unbundling schemes” (Bourreau 
& Doğan, 2004: p289). 
 
Sub-loop unbundling – where the entrant connects to a point in the local 
loop (usually at the primacy connection point or street cabinet) on a full or 
shared basis. Best suited to fibre to the curb environments where high-
speed bandwidth connections are being provided. (Telecommunications 
Authority of Trinidad & Tobago, 2009: p15) 
 
UMTS – universal mobile telecommunications system, a mobile 
technology used to deliver data at high-speed.  
 
Wholesale access services – services provided to a company for resale, 
for example, bitstream access provided to an entrant by an incumbent to 
enable the entrant to resell said services to consumers. 
WiMax – worldwide interoperability for microwave access, a high-speed, 
wireless, broadband access technology. 
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Chapter 1 A comedy of errors in LLU regulation  
1.1 Introduction 
South Africa's telecommunications market is still lacking competition in the 
fixed line sector despite government efforts to liberalise. One of the policy 
interventions aimed at remedying this is local loop unbundling. The local 
loop is the last mile of copper between a telephone exchange and a 
customer's premises. Local loop unbundling is a process whereby that last 
mile of copper wire is made available to telecommunications operators to 
offer services competing with those offered by the incumbent 
telecommunications company, which owns the infrastructure. Local loop 
unbundling has been implemented worldwide by at least 25 countries 
since it was first posited in the 1980s.  
 
In this chapter the researcher briefly outlines the problem of 
telecommunications access in South Africa. The access discussion is 
followed by an outline of the reform of the telecommunications sector to 
date, specifically the government's efforts at remedying the access 
situation. Thereafter, the researcher sketches the objective, questions, 
methodology and theoretical framework for this research, before 
concluding with a brief note on how this research will contribute to policy 
as a whole.  
1.2 The problem of telecommunications access in South 
Africa 
 
Access to telecommunications services in South Africa has been 
restricted, historically, and access to some services is still limited based on 
the consumer's location or ability to pay for such services. Access was 
initially restricted by the monopoly incumbent's inability to roll out services 
to all areas, and later due to the high cost of fixed line and mobile 
services. Today, while the fixed line network has consistently shrunk for at 
least the past decade, mobile telephony has become ubiquitous and 
Internet access is increasing, mainly thanks to mobile data connectivity 
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(although it is not universally available or affordable by any means). 
Growth in the mobile space is not expected to slow, while fixed is expected 
to decline further, following the trajectory outlined in the tables 1 and 2 
below. 
 
Table 1: Telecommunications penetration 2002 – 2011 
 Year  
2002  
2003   
2004  
2005   
2006 
2007 
2008  
2009  
2010  
Fixed lines# 
4 924 000  
4 844 000 
4 821 000  
4 726 000  
4 708 000  
4 642 000 
4 533 000 
4 451 000   
4 273 000 
Mobile subscribers 
11 000 000*  
16 000 000§ 
21 000 000§ 
30 000 000§ 
35 000 000§ 
41 000 000§ 
46 000 000§ 
51 800 000* 
50 000 000* 
2011 4 152 000$ 52 000 000± 
 
# - Muller (2011) 
* - Creamer Media Research Unit (2010) 
$ - Telkom (2011) 
§ - van Eeden (2009) 
± - Cell C (2012), MTN (2011), Vodacom (2010) 
Table 2: Estimated telecommunications penetration 2012 – 2015 
Year  
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Fixed lines§ 
3 471 000 
3 297 000 
3 143 000 
2 994 000 
Mobile subscribers* 
57 820 000 
60 140 000 
62 000 000 
63 600 000 
 
* - African Telecoms News (2011) 
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§ - Economist Intelligence Unit (2011) 
 
South Africa's regulator and policymaker believe a bottleneck exists at the 
last mile of the fixed line telecommunications network in that this 
infrastructure is still controlled by historical monopoly incumbent Telkom, 
and is too expensive for new entrants to duplicate. Freeing up this 
bottleneck, it is believed, will enable competition in the last mile sector of 
the market and give customers more choice of provider for both voice and 
Internet services, consequently reducing costs and improving availability 
and quality of these services. LLU has been posited as a means to unplug 
this access bottleneck. 
 
LLU is a policy intervention designed to increase competition as part of the 
process of liberalising a telecommunications sector, and unplug the 
bottleneck at the last mile. It involves making the last mile of copper wire 
between a telecommunications exchange and a consumer available to 
telecommunications operators to offer services competing with those 
offered by the incumbent operator, which owns the infrastructure. 
 
LLU was first discussed in South Africa in 2003. A Ministerial directive 
issued four years later made it possible for LLU to be implemented, 
provided the regulator, ICASA, published regulations to make it so. At the 
time of writing in early 2012 it had still not been implemented, and as 
regulatory and industry attention has turned to the issue of frequency 
spectrum and the allocation thereof for use by the operators to provide 4G 
services, it is unlikely to be introduced this year either. Technology, and the 
market, is moving on apace, however, and some commentators have 
noted that the time for local loop unbundling has passed, while others still 
believe it is a crucial intervention to ensure competition in the sector. 
1.3 Government's efforts at reform 
1.3.1 Managed liberalisation  
Until 1993, telecommunications services in the country were provided 
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solely by the incumbent monopoly provider – Telkom (Pty) Ltd. The 
licensing of two mobile network operators (MNOs), Vodacom and MTN, in 
that year, brought competition to the voice telephony sector for the first 
time while the country was undergoing a profound political transformation, 
from an exclusionist society split along racial lines (per the apartheid policy 
of the National Party government) to what the country's first President 
Nelson Mandela called a rainbow nation – inclusive, equal, open.  
 
The country's first democratic elections took place in 1994, and the 
policies the ANC government put in place following its taking power would 
profoundly affect the telecommunications sector going forward. It was ANC 
intervention that saw 50 percent of mobile operator Vodacom go to Telkom 
(ANC, 2010: p2), for example. Additionally, it was the ANC's wariness of 
letting institutions provided for in Section Nine of the Constitution have a 
degree of independence that has proven problematic for ICASA (Currie & 
Horwitz, 2007: p6). Other examples exist but are beyond the scope of this 
background discussion. 
 
1996 saw the promulgation of the Telecommunications Act, which aimed to 
regulate telecommunications and broadcasting “in the public interest” 
(Telecommunications Act, 1996) and which served as one of a number of 
government initiatives aimed at realising government's vision of an 
inclusive information society (Gillwald, 2003: p5). South Africa, as a 
member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
adopted the policy framework adopted by the region for 
telecommunications sector reform. “The framework made provision for 
privatization, an exclusivity period, followed by further review of options for 
introducing competition” (Riley Allen, 2003: p1). In South Africa this was 
called the 'Managed Liberalisation' policy, and was announced by then 
President Thabo Mbeki in a Parliamentary address on 9 February 2001, 
and referred to in an address by then Minister of Communications Ivy 
Matsepe-Casaburri (2001, p1) on 11 February 2001. In said speech, 
Matsepe-Casaburri stated that:  
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 ... government has started with the process of introducing 
 managed liberalisation of the telecommunications industry with the 
 hosting of the national telecommunications colloquium in February 
 2001. The colloquium was aimed at providing a platform for different 
 sectors of society to make inputs on the future of the 
 telecommunications policy, and the industry in general. Government 
 envisages finalising the policy by the end of the first quarter of 
 2001 (Minister of Communications, 2001: p1). 
 
The concept of managed liberalisation was first introduced with the 
Telecommunications Policy White Paper drafted in 1995 and 1996, which 
informed the provisions of the amended Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
The paper was hammered out through a series of consultations with 
industry, and provided for a timeline for liberalisation. The final Act, 
however, differed from the Green and White Papers. 
 If there is an “original sin” moment, an event that cast South 
 African telecommunications reform along a particular path, it was 
 the alteration of the White Paper as draft legislation went to 
 Parliament in 1996. The Telecommunications Act vested in the 
 Minister several of the powers the White Paper had reserved for the 
 Regulator and eliminated the White Paper‟s painstakingly achieved 
 liberalization timetable in favor of ministerial discretion regarding 
 when and if various segments of the sector would be opened to 
 competition (Republic of South Africa, 1996b). … Although the 
 White Paper, like the Telecommunications Act, gave Telkom a 5-
 year period of exclusivity to fulfill a universal service mandate (the 
 Act offered an optional sixth year), two elements of the White Paper 
 would likely have opened the sector relatively quickly, without 
 damaging Telkom. Resale of communications service by other 
 private entities was to be permitted after three years, and self-
 provision of links to the backbone network was always to be 
 permitted if and when Telkom could not accommodate the request 
 with reasonable quality in reasonable time (Currie & Horwitz, 
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 2007: p7, 8). 
 
As Horwitz and Currie note, all the exclusivity period did was enable 
Telkom to entrench its interests in the sector, and raise its prices to 
punitive levels (Currie & Horwitz, 2007: p1).  
 By the end of the five year exclusivity attached to the privatisation, 
 there were fewer residential lines than in 1997, which have 
 continued to decline; Telkom‟s prices and costs continued to be 
 protected for the (IPO) initial private offering; and ineffective 
 regulation of the incumbent resulted in anti-competitive behaviour 
 which had a chilling effect on the liberalised segments of the 
 market (Comninos, Esselaar, Gillwald, Moyo & Naidoo, 2010: p5). 
 
Telkom's exclusivity period was scheduled to come to an end on 7 May 
2002, as per the Telecommunications Act (1996 as amended by Act 64 of 
2001). By then it was due to have installed “2.69 million new access lines 
(including 1.67 million lines in under-serviced areas)” as well as connected 
“3 204 villages, and install[ed] 120 000 payphones” (Schofield & Sithole, 
2006: p9). In fact, it had disconnected 1 766 000 lines by 2002 (Hodge, 
2003: p6). Ministerial Directions issued by the late Minister Ivy Matsepe-
Casaburri in September 2004 went some way towards liberalising the 
market, by enabling mobile telecommunications providers to acquire fixed 
lines from a provider other than Telkom, enabling value-added network 
service providers (VANS) to supply voice over any protocol, enabling 
VANS to provide services over facilities provided by operators other than 
Telkom or the Second Network Operator and enabling private 
telecommunications network operators to resell or lease spare capacity, 
amongst other things, as of 1 February 2005 (Minister of Communications, 
2004). These determinations were very positively received by industry. 
Headlines like 'VOIP to be legal at last', from ITWeb (Vechiatto & 
Weidemann, 2004), were common, and the news that VANS would be 
able to self-provide their own facilities or lease from alternative providers 
was particularly well-received. Unfortunately, the Minister reversed her 
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decision on self-provisioning just before it was due to come into effect, in a 
press statement issued on 31 January 2005 (no longer available online but 
cited by ISPA, amongst others, in reference to the subsequent Altech court 
case). This would later lead to the Altech court case which overturned her 
reversal and enabled more than 500 value-added network service 
providers (VANS) in South Africa to provide their own infrastructure or 
lease it from whichever provider they preferred (Ellipsis, 2008). 
 
The much anticipated second network operator was licensed in December 
2005, following “significant delays” (Aproskie, Hodge, Lipschitz, Sheik, 
2008: p6). That same year, the liberalisation process was continued 
through the drafting and promulgation of the Electronic Communications 
Act (2005), previously known as the Convergence Bill. The Convergence 
Bill was drafted with the aim of enabling the Department of 
Communications and ICASA to respond to the convergence happening in 
the ICT sector, in terms of technology and the converged services it 
enables (Department of Communications, 2003: p3). A strong driver for the 
regulatory reform envisaged by the Department of Communications (the 
driving force behind the Colloquium) was the need to provide universal 
access and service, as evinced by the prominence this is given both in the 
National Convergence Policy Colloquium report and the subsequent 
Convergence Bill. The bill provided for a strengthened regulator through 
providing the regulator with funding from licensing fees as well as a 
technology-neutral licensing structure. Where previously operators were 
licensed to provide, for example, telecommunications services over a 
mobile telephone network, they would now be licensed to provide 
communications services or communications network services irrespective 
of the technology used.  
 
Competitive interventions like LLU, while raised at the Colloquium 
(Department of Communications, 2003: p9), were not included in the draft. 
Interconnection fees, which determine what fee an operator pays to 
another operator to connect a call to its network, and facilities-leasing 
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guidelines, which determine the parameters for operators to lease facilities 
from each other, were. Both are essential to ensuring a level playing field 
in a liberalising market (Melody, 1997 & 2001).  
 
LLU would only become a matter for serious debate with the 
Telecommunications Pricing Colloquia held in July and October 2005, 
when the matter was tabled for debate by the Ministry (Hellkom, 2005). 
The Colloquia addressed retail pricing but also noted that:  
 the local loop had to be either unbundled or opened for shared 
 access; self-provisioning of VANS providers had to be revisited; 
 ownership or custody of SAT-3 [the submarine cable that runs down 
 the east coast of Africa and was South Africa' sole submarine cable 
 until recently] had to be re-examined and access expanded; the 
 wholesale rate on line rentals for ISPs and the question of leased 
 line costs needed urgent attention (Sutherland, 2007: p91). 
 
The finalised Convergence Bill was promulgated as the Electronic 
Communications Act and signed into law by then President Thabo Mbeki 
in April 2006 (Act 36 of 2005). It made provision for LLU to take place, 
provided ICASA made regulations to enable it (Telkom, 2008). 
1.3.2 Protectionism  
Any discussion on competition in the South African electronic 
communications sector would be incomplete without a discussion on 
Telkom, and government's protectionist policy towards the monopoly 
incumbent. Telkom was originally part of the Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications, which was spit into Telkom Ltd, and the SA Post 
Office in 1991. Under the Telecommunications Act, promulgated in late 
1996, Telkom was issued with three licenses - PSTS for telephony, VANS 
for Internet/data services, radio frequency transmission for radio/wireless 
transmissions. It was also granted a five year exclusivity period in May 
1997, granting it the exclusive right to provide telecommunications 
services in South Africa, subject to roll out obligations. VANS were only 
allowed to provide services using infrastructure provided by Telkom, and 
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were thus subject to Telkom's pricing and service decisions.   
 
1997 was also the year the government embarked on its managed 
liberalisation programme. The South African Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (SATRA) was formed in February of that year and 
rate rebalancing was introduced in an effort to redress the cross-
subsidisation Telkom had been engaging in, and adjust pricing so that 
customers paid prices that more closely resembled the cost of the service 
provided. Telkom had until then been 100 percent state-owned. Thirty 
percent was sold to Thintana, a consortium made up of SBC (US) and 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad, for R5,58 billion in May that same year 
(Telkom, 2010) as part of a government bid to reap some reward from the 
assets it owned. 
 
While Telkom had an exclusivity period, it didn't have the market all to 
itself. VANS provided service-based competition in the fledging Internet 
service provision space, although Telkom stymied the ISPs that competed 
with it and relied on it for infrastructure at every opportunity, and its 
relations with other ISPs could only be called litigious. The mobile 
operators, MTN and Vodacom (part owned by Telkom) provided 
competition for voice services, although, as Telkom was providing all fixed 
links to the operators, it was not losing out on revenue there either.  
 
Following the formation of ICASA in 2000, the third mobile network 
operator, Cell C, was licensed in June 2001 and the Telecommunications 
Amendment Act was introduced in November that year. It prohibited LLU 
for at least two years after the licensing of a second network operator, 
scheduled for 2002. It scheduled carrier pre-select, which would enable 
consumers to select which provider to make a call with on a call by call 
basis, for 2003 and mobile number portability (MNP), which would let 
consumers change operators without losing their mobile number, for 2005.  
 
All of the above steps in the liberalisation process were delayed by several 
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years. Telkom's exclusivity ended in May 2002, the SNO was eventually 
issued with a license in 2005. MNP happened a year later and carrier pre-
select (CPS) came into effect in 2010, although to date it has not been 
implemented by any operator. This is partly because the incumbent has 
set the call origination fee at 43c, making it too expensive for any other 
player to be able to offer services using CPS. This is because a local call 
costs a minimum of 57c, plus the operator handling the call would likely 
have to pay interconnect fees (12c on a local call and 19c on a national 
call) and then need to make some revenue on the call too. LLU, which 
South Africa could theoretically have started implementing in 2004, is still 
not a reality. 
 
Telkom listed on the Johannesburg and New York stock exchanges in 
2003. Its shareholders were government (39.3 percent), Thintana (30 
percent), Ucingo (3 percent) and the public (27.7 percent). The ongoing 
government ownership provided a clear conflict of interest for the Minister 
of Communications – tasked with determining policy for the sector as a 
whole while simultaneously protecting the state's interest in Telkom. This 
ongoing problem has been frequently likened to the Minister being both 
referee and player on the telecommunications pitch (McLeod, 2012).  
 
The Convergence Bill was eventually promulgated as the Electronic 
Communications Act (ECA) and went some way to remedy the 
protectionist policies put in place by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(as amended). The first draft was released in December 2003. Introduced 
in a bid to prepare SA for the future electronic communications 
environment, it converged the regulation of broadcasting and 
telecommunications, and aimed to move the licensing regime away from 
technology-based licensing into a horizontal regime. The bill was also 
intended to clarify the cross-jurisdictions that existed between ICASA and 
the Minister of Communications and provide ICASA with better financing, 
thus strengthening it as an independent regulator. Whether it achieved all 
of its aims is a matter for debate, but the licensing regime proved crucial to 
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the ongoing liberalisation of the sector.  
 
Telkom and the SNO were guaranteed exclusive rights to PSTS (fixed line 
voice) licences in the Telecommunications  Act (1996). The legal 
exclusivity period expired in 2002. The SNO was also granted the right to 
use Telkom's infrastructure from the time it was licensed until 7 May 2004. 
The extensive delays in issuing this license meant that Neotel never had 
the opportunity to do so.  
 
The legalisation of Voice over IP (VoIP) could probably be called the first 
concrete step towards real competition in the market. VoIP was prohibited 
in terms of the Telecommunications Act (1996). It was then legalised by 
Ministerial Directive in late 2004, opening up the market for alternative 
voice over wire provision. This same directive allowed VANS to self-
provide, a right many in the sector had been lobbying for heavily for years. 
This right was subsequently revoked by the Minister via a press statement. 
ICASA then implemented the initial decision in 2008 when the time came 
to convert VANS licenses to the new licenses as stipulated in the 
Electronic Communications Act (2005), following a court challenge.  
 
Draft new license types as specified under the ECA (2005) - individual and 
class Electronic Communications Service and individual and class 
Electronic Communications Network licenses - were issued in February 
2009. Once it became clear that VANS would not be able to self-provide 
Altech took the matter to court, and won, thus striking the single biggest 
blow for liberalisation and against government's 'protect Telkom at all 
costs' stance. Unfortunately, as this happened so suddenly, new licensees 
were not in a position to take advantage of this unforeseen market 
opportunity, and network roll outs by new licensees have been limited.  
 
Competition in the telecommunications sector has to be balanced against 
the need for consumer protection and market sustainability (ITU & InfoDev, 
2010: p13) rather than being driven purely by financial considerations. In 
25 
South Africa, this has not happened. The interests of the state as a 
shareholder in a monopoly telecommunications company have been put 
ahead of the interests of the country. Privatisation happened ahead of 
liberalisation, and liberalisation is still happening very slowly.  
 
Due to the importance of the sector to both social and economic 
development, governments and regulators have to consider what type of 
competition will have what impact. Competition is important not in and of 
itself, but rather because of the benefits it brings, to whit: Lower prices, 
more products and services, increased choice for the consumer (ITU & 
InfoDev, 2010: p13).  
 
As policy and regulatory decision-making unfolds in South Africa, 
regulators, government and private sector players need to consider what 
type of competition is appropriate: That which achieves government's aim 
of universal access? That which aids private sector goals related to market 
share and profit? That which delivers the most benefit (and protection) to 
consumers? All three? Two out of three? The state seems to view itself as 
a benevolent intervener. Is that view appropriate and accurate? Would a 
totally different paradigm not be more appropriate? For example, one in 
which the state adopts a hands-off approach and uses policy and 
regulation to enable players in the sector to roll out services to areas 
where they see a market and can deliver services for profit. 
 
A further factor is the technology itself. The advent of mobile telephony 
and broadband has profoundly changed the telecommunications sector. 
Models of competition and regulation that served the industry for decades 
may well be headed for obsolescence and regulators need to consider that 
what is regulated today might be irrelevant in six months. 
 
South Africa also does not exist in a vacuum - global regulatory trends are 
moving away from static (controlling) to dynamic (encouraging investment 
and innovation) regulation (Bauer & Bohlin, 2007: p1). The country needs 
26 
to evolve its own policy and regulatory environment in line with global 
trends as much as it needs to keep adopting new technologies so as to 
not fall behind and prejudice its citizens and its future. 
1.3.3 Regulating for LLU 
In her 2006 Budget Speech (May 2006), the Minister announced that LLU 
needed to be investigated. She appointed a Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee later that year (Sutherland, 2007: p91). The Committee 
delivered its report, 'Local loop unbundling: A way forward for South Africa', 
on 23 May 2007 and the Minister subsequently issued a Policy Decision 
that ICASA should implement LLU by 2011 (Telkom, 2010). In 2010, 
Minister of Communications Roy Padayachie indicated that the 
Department was still working to a November 2011 deadline (Minister of 
Communications, 2010: p5), but market sentiment and discussion, mainly 
in the media, considered this unlikely given the scope of work to be done.  
 
ICASA released a discussion document on LLU on 22 June 2011 (ICASA, 
2011a: p2), calling for comment by stakeholders by 14 September 2011. 
According to the document, ICASA is of the opinion that LLU is mandated 
under the facilities leasing regulations, and that these regulations cover 
the terms of any agreements drawn up under that section of the Electronic 
Communications Act (2005) - section 43. This is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, this has implications in terms of how LLU will play out as it 
largely leaves industry to negotiate its own agreements, something that 
local telecommunications history would indicate is likely to end up in long 
running legal disputes that advance no-one's interests, and once again 
leave consumers stuck with high costs and ineffective service. 
 
Secondly, Telkom doesn't agree that facilities leasing regulations apply to 
LLU and refused access to its local loops to Neotel, which has lodged a 
dispute with ICASA as a result. The case went before ICASA's Complaints 
and Compliance Committee in May 2012 and the Committee found that 
Neotel's request was valid and that Telkom had contravened the 
regulations in its response. The Committee stated that ICASA must finalise 
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LLU regulations for a “practical and reasonable solution” to be found  
(Vermeulen, 2012). 
 
The regulator announced a phased roll out of LLU on 30 November 2011. 
In the press statement (ICASA, 2011b) announcing its Framework for 
Introducing Local Loop Unbundling, ICASA chairman Stephen Mncube 
said that the Authority is taking a phased approach to LLU. He said that a 
public consultation process will be undertaken to establish an Access Line 
Deficit Recovery Scheme. Additionally, ICASA was to engage with industry 
on the pricing of Telkom's IP Connect service and expected this to be 
reduced by 31 March 2012. Telkom's IP Connect service is crippled form 
of bitstream unbundling. ICASA said it aimed to ensure a true bitstream 
offering was introduced by 1 November 2012 (ICASA, 2011c). So far, 
Telkom reduced the cost of its IP Connect service in April 2012, but no 
bitstream alternative has been introduced (Mochiko, 2012). As a separate 
process, the regulator has stated its intention to investigate wireless LLU, 
something the mobile operators have been opposed to, to date.  
 
As the debate on LLU plays out in South Africa, the regulator has a role to 
play both in fulfilling its mandate and in contributing to the debate from the 
perspective of the consumer, and the local policy framework. Private 
industry is adept at lobbying and speaking up for its own interests. The 
regulator has a mandated role to play here in ensuring universal service 
and access goals are met, in line with government's plans for the country. 
South Africa's government wants to implement LLU in a bid to increase 
innovation, increase the quantity and quality of services, reduce the prices 
paid by customers and increase the number of available business 
opportunities (Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007: pi). It also aims 
to: “facilitate affordable open access, lower prices of telecommunications 
and offer a wide choice of access to ICT services” (Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee, 2007: pviii).  
 
It is not clear, however, given all the problems and challenges raised by 
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the authors writing on the subject, whether LLU should be attempted in 
South Africa at all. Very little conclusive research has been done on the 
use of LLU to unplug the last mile access bottleneck in developing 
markets, which have only recently reached a stage of market liberalisation 
where an intervention like LLU would be appropriate or desirable. As such, 
there has been very little research into whether or not LLU can increase 
competition in a developing market or not. This question is important for 
policymakers and regulators who tend to believe that a de facto outcome 
of a LLU exercise is increased competition. If this is not so, many policies 
and approaches will need to be revisited. 
1.4 Research problem 
South Africa has an electronic communications access problem, which the 
government has to date tried to remedy using a policy called 'managed 
liberalisation'. As it became apparent that this approach was not 
appropriate to telecoms sector development, policymakers began to 
liberalise the market. As part of this liberalisation, LLU has been posited as 
a remedy to unplug the access bottleneck at the last mile. This research 
studies LLU as a measure to increase competitiveness, and its 
appropriateness for the local market.  
 
This research covers the period from 1994 when the first mobile network 
operator licenses were issued to early 2012 as the LLU process was 
unfolding. South Africa's telecommunications market is still lacking 
competition in the fixed line segment despite government efforts to 
liberalise. One of the policy interventions aimed at remedying this is LLU. 
LLU has been implemented worldwide by a number of countries since it 
was first posited in the 1980s.  
 
The objective of the research was to describe and analyse the issues 
pertaining to LLU and competition in South Africa and to assess the 
implications of LLU for policymakers. 
 
This research utilises a model developed by Hausman and Sidak (2005) 
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and amended by the researcher, draws on the body of literature on LLU, 
interviews with experts and documentary analysis in order to analyse LLU, 
competition and the anticipated outcomes of an unbundling exercise in the 
local telecommunications market. 
1.5  Purpose statement 
This study utilises a model developed by Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
which empirically tests four major rationales for LLU, to compare the 
academic literature on LLU and competition and a series of characteristics 
and consequences of LLU highlighted by the regulator, policymaker and 
industry players in the South African market.  
 
The data that this comparison produces is analysed, broad themes are 
identified, and a framework is constructed. This framework can be used by 
policymakers and regulators to determine if a specific rationale for 
unbundling, coupled with a specific type of unbundling, will result in a 
certain type of competition.  
 
This is the first time the Hausman and Sidak (2005) model has been 
applied in an ex ante context in a developing country with a market that 
has not fully matured.  
1.6 Research questions 
Main Question: In which ways would LLU influence competition? 
Sub Questions: 
1. What effects is LLU expected to have on competition in the South 
African market?  
2. How does LLU impact entrants, the incumbent and consumers? 
3. How should policymakers exploit the opportunities and address the 
challenges that arise out of LLU? 
1.7 Research methodology  
The researcher conducted a social research study into an aspect of the 
telecommunications sector that has real world applicability.  
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Both primary and secondary research techniques were used. Qualitative 
research was conducted – using surveys and in-depth interviews. The 
findings were analysed and a framework was drafted to guide policy and 
regulation. 
 
In designing the research methodology, the study utilises a model 
developed by Hausman and Sidak (2005), which takes four major 
rationales for LLU and empirically tests them, as well as other academic 
literature on LLU and competition to explore and understand the 
documentation on LLU - produced by the regulator, policymaker and 
industry players in the South African market - and the process thus far in 
South Africa. Further data was generated through primary research 
conducted amongst a purposively selected group of industry participants. 
1.8 Policy Contributions 
The research report contributes to an understanding of LLU as an efficient 
and effective regulatory intervention.  Furthermore this research report 
produces policy recommendations that may address issues of i) regulatory 
effectiveness, ii) competition and iii) overall consumer welfare in South 
Africa. The recommendations made are largely directed towards improving 
the formulation, adoption and implementation of LLU in South Africa. It has 
implications for regulators, policymakers and operators. 
 
This research is important because of the enormous social and economic 
importance of the electronic communications sector, since it supports 
efficient communications in all economic sectors. According to the ITU 
(1997, p7): 
 Good telecommunications impact positively on all aspects of 
 economic, cultural and social development. In agriculture, fisheries, 
 and forestry, markets for produce and production can be matched 
 with supply, weather and environmental information can be made 
 available, and "best practice" techniques can be shared. 
 Manufacturing benefits from more efficient markets, both for input 
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 resources and for goods produced. On the service side, tourism is 
 enabled, bringing visitors to newly feasible locations, and remote 
 financial transactions become possible. Public service and 
 governance improve because of information flow and transaction 
 possibilities. Health care can be improved through telemedicine 
 applications. Access to educational opportunities and available 
 information is made possible. 
 
This holds true not only in rural areas, but at a macro-economic level. 
Cronin, Colleran, Herbert and Lewitzky (1993: p677) argue that:  
 ...telecommunications investment enhances economic activity and 
 growth, while economic activity and growth stimulate demands for 
 telecommunications infrastructure investment. This relationship has 
 been found, in general, to hold at the national, state and sub-state 
 level of analysis and for definitions of telecommunications 
 infrastructure investment including total investment, cable and wire 
 and central office equipment. 
 
For a developing economy like South Africa, widespread and affordable 
electronic communications infrastructure is crucial. Regulatory 
interventions need to be efficient and effective. This research extends the 
understanding of LLU as an efficient and effective regulatory intervention.  
1.10 Summary 
In this chapter the researcher has outlined the problem with the access 
market in South Africa, starting with a look at fixed and mobile penetration 
rates. The researcher then delves into the relevant history of the sector. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the current state of the sector in 
terms of policy and regulation. Thereafter, LLU is defined and explained 
and a brief history of LLU as a regulatory intervention, and as it has played 
out in South Africa, is given. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of 
the objective, questions, methodology and theoretical framework for this 
research, before concluding with a brief note on how this research will 
contribute to policy as a whole. 
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Chapter 2 A conceptual framework for examining LLU 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher places LLU within the broader framework of 
economic theory. Various aspects of LLU are then examined by means of 
a review of the academic literature – its definition, types, rationales, 
impacts and effects, the market conditions under which it thrives, or fails, 
as well as case studies from a number of countries.  
 
Even drawing on a small selection of the literature, it is apparent that this 
is a complex endeavour, requiring a high degree of economic and 
regulatory expertise on the part of the national regulatory agency. Viewed 
through an economic lens, LLU aims to promote competition. Viewed 
through a social lens, it aims to improve access to and reduce the cost of 
telecommunications services. The literature shows, however, that it 
doesn't necessarily achieve either. 
2.2 Industrial organisation theory and LLU 
Regulatory interventions like LLU have a place within the broader sphere 
of economic theory – specifically within the realm of industrial organisation 
(IO) literature. The theory has been commonly used to address questions 
of overall economic efficiency in markets. 
 
As stated earlier, the researcher explores the contribution of IO theory in 
general and the SCP paradigm in particular to understanding the fixed line 
telecoms market in South Africa.    
 
The general approach suggested by the IO model focuses on three 
interrelated concepts, namely industry structure, industry conduct and 
industry performance (Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
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Figure 1: Traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Approach 
diagram 
 
Industry Structure
(Number of competing firms)
Firm Conduct
(Firm strategies and Pricing behaviour)
Performance
(Firms, Industry, Society)
Policy and 
Regulations
The Traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Approach
Basic conditions in which the approach is embedded
 
Source: Adapted from Scherer and Ross, 1990 
 
Industrial organisation, according to Cabral (2000, p3):  
 is concerned with the workings of markets and industries, in 
 particular the way firms compete with each other... its emphasis [is] 
 on the study of the firm strategies that are characteristic of market 
 interaction: price competition, product positioning, advertising, 
 research and development, and so forth. 
 
Industrial organisation has a specific goal, Cabral (2000, p3) states, to 
address the four questions of whether there is market power, how firms 
acquire and maintain said power, what the implications of market power 
are and if there is a public policy for market power. 
 
Jacquemin (2000, p9) says that IO looks at the number of competitors in a 
market, the distribution of market share, entry and exit conditions, product 
standardisation and substitutable goods, how interdependent upstream 
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and downstream activities are, information asymmetry and risk. 
 
According to Jacquemin (2000, p9):  
 Market analysis, either from the point of view of the firm that 
 operates or desires to operate in it, or from the viewpoint of the 
 public authorities, requires proper characterization. The principal 
 objective of industrial organisation has been precisely to provide 
 this characterization, resorting to a scheme that relates the market 
 structure with the behaviour of the economic agents who operate in 
 it and with the performances that such a relation generates. 
 
Such schemes include what is called the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm (SCPP). SCPP is an approach that states that a market's 
structure will influence the conduct of the firms which operate in it, which 
will accordingly influence their, and the market's, performance. This 
applies both ways, thus a market's or company's performance affects the 
conduct of all the players, which then affects market structure. SCPP is 
used to analyse structure, conduct and performance and the relationships 
between these elements.  
 
Says Schmalensee (1989, p954):  
 In any complete market model, such as the textbook models of 
 monopoly and competition, market structure determines market 
 conduct - the behavioral rules followed by buyers, sellers, and 
 potential entrants to choose the variables under their control. 
 Market performance is assessed by comparing the results of market 
 conduct to first-best ideals, such as perfect competition, or feasible 
 alternatives. In 
 
Policymakers today are concerned with such matters in part because of 
two things – the drive to liberalise monopoly industries, ie, to create 
competition where there was none, and because of the impact markets 
and firms have on social welfare. The conduct and performance of 
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organisations and markets impacts both consumers and employees. It is in 
a bid to ensure that this conduct maximises said welfare (through 
allocative and productive efficiency) that governments regulate, the view 
being that organisations will not behave in a way that maximises either 
competition or social welfare without regulation to compel them to do so.   
 
Telecommunications has traditionally been a monopoly sector, and, as 
such, some governments have, either directly or through issuing policy to 
independent regulators, intervened to move it along the road from 
monopoly to a state of competition - perfect or imperfect. Local loop 
unbundling is one of the interventions that have been used by 
governments and regulators to alter a market's structure in a bid to 
introduce more competition. 
 
For the purposes of this study: 
 Industry Structure: Refers to the potential of LLU to change 
monopoly access (Telkom) to a more competitive access model 
(new entrants) since the unbundling of the local loop is intended to 
lower cost and entry barriers to new entrants. 
 Firm Conduct: Refers to the potential of LLU to change the strategic 
pricing behaviour of Telkom and new entrants. New entrants in 
particular will seek to price their offerings in such a manner as to 
gain competitive advantage. 
 Performance: Refers to the potential of LLU to change the 
performance of Telkom and new entrants in ways that improve 
overall consumer welfare. 
2.2.1 Why regulate telecommunications? 
According to the ITU and InfoDev (2011), as telecommunications markets 
have liberalised, regulation has been put in place by governments to 
ensure a smooth transition from monopoly telecommunications markets to 
liberalised markets with multiple players. Regulation is put in place to 
combat the potential problems that arise during such a transition, for 
example, disputes and anti-competitive abuses. Regulation also exists to 
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protect consumers and ensure the national interest is served, in this case 
governmental goals of universal access, competitiveness, industrial 
development and so on. 
 
Regulation, say the ITU and InfoDev (2012, p10): 
 is the vehicle to attain, and subsequently sustain, widespread 
 access, effective competition and consumer protection. The 
 liberalisation and introduction of competition in the market requires 
 strategic policies and regulations that establish an effective 
 regulator, remove explicit barriers to entry (eg, the inability to 
 interconnect with the incumbent operator), and dismantle implicit 
 barriers (such as the potential influence of the incumbent 
 telecommunications operator over the regulator).  
 
As such, regulation serves to prevent market failure, protect consumers, 
prevent abuses and create effective competition. (ITU & InfoDev, 2012: 
p10). 
2.2.2 Competition theory 
“The presence of competitive pressure in the market is associated with 
more employment, higher output, faster network expansion, and higher 
labor and total factor productivity,” note Li and Xu (2002, p3). Competition, 
as such, is desirable as far as governments and policymakers are 
concerned, and much economic theory is concerned with it, and how it 
should be created or encouraged, specifically in traditional monopoly 
sectors such as telecommunications. LLU, with which this paper is 
concerned, is a regulatory intervention aimed at stimulating competition in 
telecommunications markets that were historically served by a monopoly 
incumbent. There are other interventions, including facilities leasing and 
carrier pre-select. 
2.3 Implications of key industrial organisation concepts for 
LLU 
The local loop is the last mile of copper between a telephone exchange 
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and a customer's premises. LLU is one of a number of possible 
interventions aimed at liberalising the last mile, the others include facilities 
leasing, and carrier pre-select, plus facilities-based entry and resale of 
services (Bacchiocchi, Florio, Gambaro, 2007: p5).  
 
Historically built and owned by the monopoly operator, local loops are 
expensive to build and maintain. Because of this, and because of the time 
period in which they have had sole access to a market in which to build up 
a customer base, monopoly operators are considered to hold market 
power with respect to an essential facility. “Market power prevails if a 
natural monopoly exists in conjunction with sunk costs,” states Gabelmann 
(2001, p21), who notes that LLU is a means to discipline this monopoly 
market power. “Competition has never really emerged in this area and it 
would be prohibitively expensive for a competitor to build an alternative 
fixed local loop of this nature,” comments Rowe (2001, p1). 
 
Initially seen as a means to liberalise the voice telephony market, LLU is 
now, as de Bijl and Peitz (2004, p1) note, more often seen as a means for 
new entrants to be able to offer broadband services. Technological 
innovations like the ability to carry voice over data networks (voice over 
Internet protocol or VoIP), however, look to take voice back into the 
spotlight and have once again rendered LLU a potential means to drive 
competition in that space. 
 
LLU is considered a means to encourage facilities-based competition in a 
market. As Bourreau and Doğan (2005: p174) note: “Facility-based 
competition in the telecommunications industry is perceived as a 
necessary condition for long-term efficiency. For the full functioning of 
competition, it is necessary that each operator controls its supply chain to 
the largest possible extent.” The drive for efficiency is often a 
governmental motive for regulating the sector in the first place. 
 
Mandatory LLU is a controversial topic, however, and whether the benefits 
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outweigh the risks is still a matter for debate. Says Doyle (2000, p35): 
“...mandatory ULL can yield benefits, but these must be weighed against 
the costs. Regulatory schemes requiring ULL should trade-off the various 
benefits and costs, where costs due to regulatory intervention should be 
minimised.” 
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2005, p3) expand on this:  
 No matter how advanced the nature of the regulatory intervention, 
 there will always be a tradeoff between promoting static efficiency 
 through competition in the short run, and stimulating dynamic 
 efficiency through inducing entrants to roll out their own networks in 
 the longer run. This tradeoff, a „classic‟ dilemma in many 
 utility/network sectors, is given an interesting twist though, because 
 of the possibility of IP-based voice telephony. This development is 
 not only important in itself, it may also facilitate competition in 
 telecommunications over different types of networks, such as fixed, 
 mobile and WiFi. 
 
LLU is complex, complicated and requires an involved and well-informed 
and well-funded regulator. This alone makes its implementation in 
developing countries, where regulators are not known to be any of the 
above, controversial and problematic. Part of the reason for this 
complexity is that LLU involves obliging an incumbent to grant access to 
its facilities to its competitors, something most incumbents have no urge or 
incentive to do. “The appropriate framework for the assessment [of] 
whether an incumbent carrier should be forced to grant competitors 
access to his local infrastructure is the essential facilities doctrine,” 
comments Gabelmann (2001, p21) and it is this concept which is found in 
South Africa's law, specifically the Electronic Communications Act (2005).  
 
Gabelmann (2001, p21) continues:  
 For a facility to be „essential‟ several conditions have to be fulfilled 
 simultaneously (see Glasl, 1994: 308). The facility in question must 
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 be owned by a monopolist who refuses access to potential 
 downstream competitors although this would be feasible. Further 
 the facility has to be not reasonably duplicable by potential entrants 
 with the consequence that they cannot enter the downstream 
 market without being granted access to precisely this facility - in  
 short, if there exist neither active nor potential (perfect or imperfect) 
 substitutes. 
 
Incumbents have found plenty of grounds to argue against the conditions 
outlined above. In South Africa the incumbent is arguing that the local loop 
does not constitute an essential facility because there is a substitute in the 
wireless local loop (ie the mobile network), and it is no longer the dominant 
player in the sector, the mobile operators are. The fact that market power 
or significant market power, which is the concept used in South African 
law, has not been established because the regulator has not yet 
conducted a market study in a clearly defined market, provides the 
incumbent with further grounds for contestation. 
2.4 A framework for LLU 
As discussed earlier, the traditional SCPP method is combined with a 
regulatory economic approach adapted from Hausman and Sidak (2005).  
The latter is intended to supplement the SCPP model and is used as the 
framework for collecting evidence that was used to answer the research 
questions. 
 
The model developed by Hausman and Sidak (2005) defines LLU, takes 
the four major rationales for unbundling and tests them empirically. The 
researcher is adopting the viewpoint that there is an inter-relationship 
between LLU and competition: that a stated definition of LLU, paired with a 
stated rationale for LLU, paired with a specific type of unbundling (full 
unbundling, line-sharing, bitstream, or sub-loop) will result in a specific 
type of competition  - retail, platform, facilities-based or wholesale. This 
takes the Hausman and Sidak (2005) model a step further by introducing 
the type of competition that results from an unbundling exercise. 
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Unbundling, as indicated in the research model, developed by the 
researcher, in Figure 2 below, affects competition in a fundamental way, 
determining both the type and effectiveness of said competition within a 
specific market context, this competition then affects the structure of the 
market in turn, in a continuous feedback loop. Policymakers need to take 
this into account when considering the most appropriate framework for 
implementing unbundling, so as to ensure that the benefits of competition 
are realised, and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the market 
concerned. 
 
Figure 2: Research model  
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The research model is adapted from Hausman and Sidak (2005). It takes 
the four major rationales highlighted in their research paper plus the four 
types of competition that will result and adds a definition of LLU and the 
types of LLU to the Hausman and Sidak (2005) model. The adapted model 
assumes an interrelationship between LLU and competition. It assumes 
that there is a relationship between the stated definition of LLU, rationale 
for and type of unbundling and the various forms of competition (retail, 
platform, facilities-based or wholesale) that will result from an unbundling 
exercise. According to the model, the type of unbundling implemented 
affects competition in fundamental ways – it determines both the type and 
effectiveness of competition that will result. The type of competition will in 
turn affect the structure of the market and the conduct and performance of 
the players in the market. 
2.4.1 Definitions and types of LLU 
LLU is variously, and often broadly defined. The OECD states (2003, p4):  
 Unbundling, as a policy, is built on the recognition that incumbent 
 carriers have a dominant position in the provision of local 
 communication access by virtue of their control over the local loop, 
 which in some OECD countries is considered as an essential facility 
 that cannot be economically replicated by alternative operators. 
 This position of dominance has resulted from the many years during 
 which incumbents had a monopoly in the provision of 
 telecommunication infrastructure and voice telephony services. 
 Despite liberalisation of telecommunication markets, it has proven 
 extremely difficult in some OECD countries to reduce the bottleneck 
 control of incumbents over the local loop and access to this loop. 
 The market power of incumbents can vary in different geographic 
 and service markets. Details of unbundling policies may therefore 
 vary according to market conditions. 
 
Bachiocchi, Florio and Gambio (2007, p7) are more brief: “Unbundling the 
local loop refers to a series of regulatory measures aimed at providing 
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access to the incumbent‟s local network, the less duplicable part of 
telecommunication infrastructure.” Baranes and Bourreau (2005, p13) are 
equally so, “Unbundling of the local loop refers to a series of regulatory 
measures aimed at providing access to the incumbent's local network.” 
 
South Africa's Local Loop Unbundling Committee believes LLU to be “the 
process of allowing both the incumbent operator and the new entrants to 
have access to use the copper-pair of the local loop infrastructure, which 
are the fixed line telephone connections from the telephone exchange to 
the customers' premises” (Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007: p2). 
 
The various commentators tend to focus on LLU as a regulatory effort 
which seeks to enable other entrants to access an incumbent's physical 
infrastructure. While this is generally taken to mean the copper wire 
between an exchange and a customer premises, it is not strictly defined as 
such, and can include any last mile technology.  
 
The types of LLU are more clearly, and simply, defined. The OECD (2003, 
p 7,8) states that full unbundling happens when the incumbent's copper is 
leased to a new entrant to use to offer services over, and the incumbent 
ceases to provide services but still owns the infrastructure and has to 
maintain it. Line sharing gives the new entrant access to some of the 
copper pair so, for example, the incumbent offers voice and the entrant 
offers broadband to the same consumer over the same (shared) line 
(OECD 2003, p 7,8). Bitstream access involves the incumbent giving 
entrants a wholesale xDSL product that they can resell to consumers – full 
control of the lines is retained by the incumbent (OECD 2003, p 7,8). Sub-
loop unbundling occurs when the entrant connects to a point in the local 
loop (usually at the primacy connection point or street cabinet) on a full or 
shared basis. This is best suited to fibre to the curb environments where 
high-speed bandwidth connections are being provided 
(Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad & Tobago, 2009: p15). 
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2.4.2 Rationales for LLU 
The most commonly cited rationales for LLU are to increase competition in 
the last mile and reduce costs (Bourreau, 2002; Christodolou & Vlahos, 
2001; De Bijl & Peitz, 2005; Rowe, 2001). Intven (2000: p3-40) states that: 
“The purpose of unbundling policies is to lower economic and technical 
barriers to competitive entry.” According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
LLU has four major rationales: to promote retail competition; to remove 
entry barriers that prevent platform competition; as a stepping-stone to 
facilities-based competition; and to promote wholesale access market 
competition (Hausman & Sidak, 2005: p173, 192).  
 
Another rationale for LLU is that giving access to competitive operators 
serves to give a new market entrant a chance to build a subscriber base 
without incurring the cost of rolling out a complete infrastructure before 
earning any income (Sutherland, 2007: p4). It is also used to ensure that 
new entrants and incumbents compete on a level playing field (Baranes & 
Bourreau, 2005: p14).  
 
The potential benefits of unbundling include enabling entry into the market 
of new players, bringing forward the offering of new services over the 
existing (incumbent's) network depending on what technology it uses, and 
increased competition in terms of services offered over the existing 
network (ITU & InfoDev, 2010: p50). 
2.4.3 The Impact on consumers, incumbent operators, new entrants 
According to de Bijl and Peitz (2005), LLU has proven challenging for 
regulators, who battle to balance the trade off between stimulating short 
term competition through interventions like LLU or encouraging network 
roll outs and the associated facilities-based competition. De Bijl and Peitz 
(2005) state that LLU should be seen as a step between carrier-select 
(also known as carrier pre-select) and full facilities-based competition.  
 
The OECD in its 2003 report, 'Developments in Local Loop Unbundling', 
notes that LLU had taken off with varying degrees of success depending 
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on, variously, how many DSLs had been rolled out, whether incumbents 
had unbundled their loops or made facilities available for colocation, 
whether all of the relevant parties had managed to reach agreement on 
colocation processes and pricing, whether there was space in exchanges 
for colocated equipment or not, how regulators were responding to 
problems with LLU (specifically how quickly they were responding), how 
far along price rebalancing was, and how much room for price squeezing 
of new entrants was left. 
 
The OECD (2003) states that “technical complexity” and the need for the 
regulator to be very involved at times causes delays in unbundling the 
local loop, that incumbents and entrants have been unable to easily set 
pricing, and that the regulator has to balance the needs of both in finding a 
solution. 
 
Frieden (2005) attempts to determine whether or not developing nations 
should adopt a LLU policy or not by considering the costs and benefits 
thereof. He outlines the benefits – increased competition – and costs – 
market distortion, and disincentivisation of incumbents and entrants to 
invest in new infrastructure and roll out new technologies. Further, he 
states, regulators have the challenge of convincing an incumbent to give 
an entrant access to its infrastructure so that the entrant can take market 
share and revenue away from it. Incumbents, he says, would have every 
incentive to legally challenge this confiscation of their property, as well as 
to do everything possible to delay LLU and delay complying with 
regulations once LLU is in place.  
 
Governments in many countries, however, Frieden (2005) notes, have 
proved unsympathetic to incumbent claims of imminent financial disaster if 
they're forced to play fair with new entrants in terms of the charges they 
levy for leasing local loops. The courts have also proven unsympathetic to 
claims that LLU amounts to the confiscation of property, he says. In the 
US, at the time Frieden (2005) was writing, incumbents were still disputing 
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whether or not the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could 
compel LLU and whether or not it was a sensible thing to do. The 
outcome, he notes, was that LLU hadn't been very successful as players 
had gone out of business, exited the market or found other things to do 
while the dispute rolled on. 
 
Regulators in developing markets will need to develop the skills and 
resources to deal with the same arguments that operators in developed 
countries have had to face, Frieden (2005) comments, also highlighting 
the risk involved for regulators trying to get pricing and provisions right. He 
suggests regulators look for new incentives to encourage incumbents to 
co-operate. He concludes that, despite the challenges, LLU should be 
attempted because if it results in even a smidgeon more competition in a 
market, it will have been worthwhile. 
2.4.4 Conditions under which LLU succeeds or fails 
Whether or not an unbundling initiative can be said to have succeeded or 
failed depends largely on what the aim of the unbundling initiative was in 
the first place. That said, several challenges are frequently raised in 
relation to unbundling exercises. 
 
According to the OECD (2003), LLU is fraught with challenges for entrants 
and regulators, and much needs to be worked out and agreed upon before 
it can be made to work. For example, how will an entrant's equipment be 
housed in an incumbent's exchange? Which type of colocation is 
appropriate or possible? Is there space for equipment? How long is a 
reasonable amount of time for an incumbent to take to make space 
available? What is a reasonable price for an incumbent to charge an 
entrant to lease a local loop? Do entrants need to provide forecasts of 
expected requirements to incumbents? If several entrants are requiring 
access to loops at a variety of exchanges how are these requests 
prioritised? How are requests from entrants to incumbents processed 
administratively? If a business client wishes to switch providers can this be 
done after hours so as not to disrupt the customer's business? What 
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service level agreements should be entered into? What penalties can or 
should be imposed for service failures? How will billing take place? How 
are faults managed? In the case where each operator (entrant and 
incumbent) insists fault lies with the other, how will disputes be resolved? 
Is self-regulation a better option than regulation? 
 
Bourreau (2002, p173) comments that if prices are set too low new 
entrants have no incentive to roll out their own facilities and may be slow 
to adopt new technologies, with negative consequences from a social 
welfare point of view. Pricing of the local loop is thus a factor in network 
roll out, and network roll out is frequently a rationale for LLU. Another 
factor is the impact of unbundling on an operator's decision whether or not 
to enter a market and what strategy to adopt as the terms and price of an 
unbundled loop affect the viability of operations in that market (Baranes & 
Bourreau, 2005: p19). If prices are too high or conditions unfavourable, 
entrants will stay away.  
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2005, p51) note that LLU seems to have a far greater 
impact on broadband penetration than telephony penetration, and that it is 
ineffective in driving competition in the voice telephony space, mainly 
because consumers are more price-sensitive with regards to broadband, 
and the cost of leasing facilities and reselling them (for new entrants 
offering voice services) is just too high. Whether the unbundling exercise 
aims to stimulate voice or broadband competition is thus also a factor. 
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2004, p5, 6) note that LLU has resulted in lively 
competition in the corporate sector and densely populated metropolitan 
areas in the United States. Geographical area and the types of customers 
to be found in a specific locale are thus a further factor. 
 
The OECD (2003, p10, 11) notes that regulator has to motivate the 
incumbent to cooperate in implementing LLU and that both incumbents 
and new entrants need to work closely together because of the way LLU is 
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implemented. It says that as this cooperation is hard to enforce, it's ideally 
done via self-regulation, but given that the incumbent has no incentive to 
cooperate, regulation is needed. What this adds up to is that the regulator, 
its expertise, resources, and ability to manage relations between parties is 
crucial to the success or failure of an LLU implementation.  
2.4.5 How LLU affects a market 
According to de Bijl and Peitz (2005), LLU had failed to give strong 
competition in the fixed line telephony sector in Europe, with only 6.5 
percent of consumers using lines provided by entrants or unbundled lines 
provided by entrants in 2004.  
 
While unbundled loops hadn't been used by new entrants to roll out voice 
services, de Bijl and Peitz (2005) note these have been used to offer 
broadband offerings, by incumbents and entrants alike.  
 
They comment that while full unbundling had not achieved its aims, 
despite three years of LLU, line sharing and bitstream unbundling 
initiatives had overall been relatively successful in introducing competition 
in the voice arena, not necessarily via fixed lines though, but rather via 
newer technologies like voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and in 
introducing competition in the Internet access space. 
 
Bourreau and Doğan (2005) argue that incumbent operators are 
incentivised to price local loops below cost in order to encourage new 
entrants to use said loops and only compete on a services basis, and not 
on a facilities basis. This, they say, impacts the building out of alternative 
technologies. 
 
Facilities-based competition is the ultimate long term goal of LLU 
interventions, as facilities-based competition provides the needed level of 
innovation and product diversity to meet consumer needs (Oftel, cited by 
Bourreau and Doğan, 2005: p174), As a prelude to this network roll out, 
LLU provides an opportunity whereby the entrant can provide services to 
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generate income to use to invest in a network. They say this doesn't often 
happen due to the pricing of the access loop, which results in delays in 
rolling out networks and new entrants falling behind, technologically 
speaking. The authors note that LLU has shown itself to be complicated 
and slow in both the US and the EU, where it has been mandated since 
1996 and 2001 respectively. 
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2004) provide an analysis of LLU, noting that it hadn't 
taken off as expected (they don't say who was expecting any specific take 
up, however) and that carrier pre-select was far more predominant in 
Europe at that time, despite there being 307 unbundling agreements 
across 15 European countries by 2003. De Bijl and Peitz (2004: p3) note 
that the general idea is that LLU will open the market and serve as a 
means to deal with “persistent network monopolies” but that LLU 
discourages entrants from innovating or rolling out their own networks and 
should, at some point, be withdrawn once competition has matured. They 
comment that LLU had promised to open telecommunications markets in 
Europe but had seen meager success in that regard at the time of writing, 
which the authors found surprising given that it offered market players an 
easy means to reach subscribers not already on their own networks.  
 
Frieden (2005) notes that in the USA, LLU has been the cause of much 
controversy and litigation, mainly due to incumbent operators who did not 
initially object to unbundling loops changing their minds once they realised 
the upside potential wasn't as profitable as they had thought it would be.  
2.5 Case Studies  
Bourreau's 2002 review of France's LLU process revealed that only 800 
lines had been unbundled, and that of 27 operators that participated in 
trials, only eight had signed unbundling contracts (Bourreau, 2002, p19). 
He notes that services-based competition had barely been affected, but 
infrastructure-based has taken off, with some 169 000 broadband 
subscribers in the country in 2001 (Bourreau, 2002, p19). 
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Hausman and Sidak (2005), consider LLU in five countries – the US, UK, 
Germany, Canada and New Zealand with the intention of determining if 
unbundling did what it was intended to do according to the rationales the 
authors outline in their paper. In each case, the outcome wasn't certain, 
with only Germany showing clear price reductions since the introduction of 
LLU, and then, as the authors note, competition from mobile networks had 
started to result in price decreases in any event.  
 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) conclude after surveying LLU efforts in five 
countries that two of the rationales for unbundling violate the principles of 
economic theory and thus cannot work. The first rationale is that 
competition in retail markets cannot be achieved without unbundling. The 
second rationale is that mandatory unbundling promotes wholesale access 
market competition. The first rationale is disproved by the existence of 
competition in the facilities space that emerged separately to unbundling 
activities in the US market, for one. And the second rationale is disproved 
by the lack of players in the wholesale access market. If it was a viable 
market segment, they argue, players would have arisen. The other two 
rationales for unbundling – lower prices and the so-called stepping-stone 
hypothesis – are viable in theory but didn't play out in practice, possibly, 
the authorsr note, because of other factors, not anticipated by the 
regulators (Hausman & Sidak, 2005, p243). 
 
Bauer and Bohlin (2007), note that the problem may not be LLU per se, 
but the pricing approach used. They state that the TELRIC approach aims 
to imitate the “long-run equilibrium price of an efficient supplier”, but that 
real markets don't work like that, rather, they are characterised by “sunk 
costs and uncertainty”, and that if option value isn't taken into account 
when models are put in place, investment decisions are distorted (Bauer & 
Bohlin, 2007, p15). 
 
Whether or not LLU is worthwhile in terms of the effort required to 
implement it resulting in sufficient economic and social returns remains 
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unclear. An OECD report (de Ridder, 2007), sets out to explain the 
reasons for OECD broadband penetration rates in 2002 and 2005. It 
determines, based on six previous studies and the analysis undertaken by 
the author, that LLU is positively correlated with increased broadband 
penetration and lower broadband prices. On the other hand, a New 
Zealand report (Boyle, Howell, Zhang, 2008), which studied whether or not 
LLU impacted broadband penetration in response to the OECD report, 
states that in fact the statistical impact is negligible once errors in the 
OECD report data had been accounted for. This is important, they state, 
because it's considered that LLU will almost de facto result in improved 
broadband services and costs, plus increased competition, its downsides, 
such as that incumbents become reluctant to invest in existing or new 
infrastructure and new entrants delaying rolling out their own networks, 
notwithstanding.  
 
If LLU does not result in improved broadband services and reduced costs 
plus improved competition then developing countries which have yet to 
unbundle local loops can take this into account when discussing the issue 
and weighing up policy options. Further, they note, it should also inform 
the debate on other access regulation going forward. 
 
A case study on Cyprus' liberalisation efforts conducted by Symeou (2009) 
reveals that four years on the incumbent still held 97 percent of fixed 
national and 87 percent of international call revenues, and that while 27 
new fixed line operators had been licensed, few had made any impact in 
the market (Symeou, 2009, p221).  
 
A 2010 paper by Nippon and Ware that examined the US and European 
markets found that:  
 ...the apparent association between unbundling and increased 
 broadband penetration is not statistically significant when relevant 
 economic, demographic and supply determinants are included in 
 the analysis. As communications networks converge and the 
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 demand for wireline services decreases globally, intermodal 
 competition is more prevalent and the benefits of unbundling are 
 more difficult to assess, and unbundling arguably becomes a 
 regulatory tool of the past. Given the dynamic nature of the 
 communications industry, the costs and the risks of implementing 
 mandatory unbundling, and the international differences in 
 geographic, demographic, and market conditions, policy makers 
 should use a case-by-case approach that carefully examines the 
 contours of the relevant market(s) at issue as well as the costs and 
 benefits of any regulatory intervention. 
 
In short, the best way to unbundle the local loop in a bid to achieve the 
objectives determined by the rationales for its implementation has still not 
been determined or agreed upon. 
2.6 Theoretical Framework  
The objective of this study was to assess the impact of a regulatory 
intervention (LLU) on specific competition outcomes in the telecom sector. 
The point of departure is that of industrial organisation theory in general 
and the commonly used concepts of Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Paradigm (SCPP) in particular (Shepherd, 1996). 
 
For purposes of analysis, the traditional SCPP method is combined with a 
regulatory economic approach adapted from Hausman and Sidak (2005).  
 
The researcher understands that there is an inter-relationship between 
LLU and competition: that a stated definition of LLU, paired with a stated 
rationale for LLU, paired with a specific type of unbundling (full unbundling, 
line-sharing, bitstream, or sub-loop) will result in a specific type of 
competition - retail, platform, facilities-based or wholesale (Hausman & 
Sidak, 2005).  
 
The Hausman and Sidak (2005) model has been used as the basis for 
analysis. According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), LLU has four major 
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rationales: to promote retail competition; to remove entry barriers that 
prevent platform competition; as a stepping-stone to facilities-based 
competition; and to promote wholesale access market competition 
(Hausman & Sidak, 2005: p173, 192). 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher has provided a review of the theory within 
which this research falls, namely Industrial Organisation theory. Thereafter 
the academic literature is used to create a framework for investigating LLU 
in South Africa's regulatory landscape. LLU is a policy intervention aimed 
at increasing competition and improving access to telecommunications 
services in a market that was dominated by a monopoly but is now 
liberalising. Four types exist – full, line-sharing, bitstream and sub-loop 
unbundling.  
 
Rationales for LLU include lowering costs, improving access and 
increasing competition in a market. LLU impacts both incumbents and new 
entrants and influences how each operates. It has been criticised for not 
resulting in improved fixed line access, but credited with increased 
broadband roll out in several markets. LLU is also said to discourage new 
entrants from rolling out their own networks or newer technologies, as they 
rely on the incumbent, which provides the network at less cost than is 
required to build a new one.  
The subject is complicated, opinions vary and different case studies draw 
different conclusions. As such, it can reasonably be concluded that 
whether or not LLU achieves it aims, according to its rationales, has yet to 
be conclusively proven. 
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Chapter 3 Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the researcher broadly outlines the research project, the 
researcher's chosen methodology, and the data sources used. The 
researcher discusses why qualitative research was done using primary 
and secondary research methods, making use of research subjects and 
documentary sources.  
3.2 Research process outline 
The researcher is presenting a social research project conducted within 
the telecommunications sector in South Africa. This research tackles a 
question of relevance to participants in the sector and is thus applied 
rather than basic research. Applied research allows researchers to meet 
specific information needs (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994: p306), such as 
answering a specific research question, relevant to a real world scenario, 
like that presented herein.  
 
At the commencement of this research project, the researcher decided to 
conduct a survey. The specific survey tool chosen was a questionnaire, 
which sought to poll the attitudes of a set of experts within the South 
African telecommunications sector. Once the questionnaires had been 
completed and the responses studied, however, it became clear that the 
survey instrument was not appropriate and the respondents had not 
supplied sufficient data for the researcher's purposes.   
 
The researcher needed sufficient data to conduct an analysis and identify 
the themes and characteristics related to LLU. Due to this lack of indepth 
data, the researcher then decided to expand the project, and conduct a 
series of semi-structured interviews to add both depth and substance to 
the findings garnered from the questionnaires that comprised the initial 
survey. These semi-structured interviews were conducted with a view to 
compiling a comprehensive set of factors that experts consider to be 
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important for LLU in South Africa. 
 
The secondary research covered publicly available documentation that 
provides some insight into the views of the policymaker, regulator and a 
variety of industry stakeholders.  
 
The data that the researcher extracted from the two research phases 
provided the broad themes that the researcher used for analysis and to 
build the framework that is the ultimate output of this study.  
3.3 Methodology 
The researcher elected to do qualitative research for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, qualitative research methodologies provide a way for a researcher 
to study matters where there are few subjects (Neuman, 1991: p13), and 
there are too few players or experts on LLU to do meaningful quantitative 
research in South Africa. Further, qualitative research allows for thematic 
analysis (Neuman, 1991: p13), which is critical in a study which needs to 
gather data, organise it into themes and develop a framework using those 
themes, as this one does. Qualitative research, additionally, enables the 
researcher to address evaluative questions (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994: 
p307), to extract textual rather than numerical data, and to capture and 
discover meaning (Neuman, 1991: p157). 
 
The researcher conducted primary and secondary research in order to 
obtain data on LLU – specifically the views of the policymaker, the 
regulator, a selected group of expert participants and academic experts.  
 
Primary research is conducted by the researcher him or herself, and 
involves the researcher designing and conducting a research project with 
the aim of collecting data that is not otherwise available with which to 
answer a particular research question. Secondary research involves 
making use of existing data that can be found in a variety of sources – 
publicly available policy documentation, organisational submissions 
related to policy processes, discussion documents and frameworks are all 
56 
examples of secondary research sources, and all are used in this 
particular study. 
 
The main question – What impact will LLU have on competition and what 
are the resulting implications for policymakers? - is answered through 
posing a series of sub-questions.   
 
The first of these is: What impact is LLU expected to have on competition 
in the South African market? This is answered through the primary and 
secondary research studies, which draw on experts within the sector, 
including representatives from the incumbent, new entrants and consumer 
representatives, and public policy documents, including the original report 
on LLU, the discussion document published by the regulator, ICASA, and 
submissions on the latter made by industry players late in 2011. The 
second sub-question: How does LLU impact entrants, the incumbent and 
consumers? is answered using the same expert panel and documentary 
sources. 
 
In this study, the researcher is asking empirical questions, ie, those that 
relate to real world problems, in order to extract evaluative answers from 
the research subjects. The primary research was conducted using a 
survey. A survey method involves asking questions of the subjects directly. 
The survey was split into two parts – questionnaires were sent to the 
respondents, then once the results had been collated, a series of 
interviews was conducted. Surveys are typically used for quantitative 
research, and if the researcher is to be totally honest, she is not certain 
that a survey was the best choice for this qualitative research project. The 
amount of data that resulted was not sufficient to allow the researcher to 
develop a framework, and follow-up interviews asking indepth questions 
were conducted to provide sufficient data for analysis. The researcher 
used expert sampling, a subset of the purposive sampling method, to 
select the survey respondents. It is a non-probability method of sampling 
that enables the researcher to purposively choose a pool of respondents 
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that are known to have expertise on a subject 
(Socialresearchmethods.net, 2013).  
 
On completion of the questionnaires, and once it had become clear that 
further data would be needed, the researcher again used the expert 
sampling method to select a group of respondents for the indepth 
interviews. In the second sample, some of the respondents to the 
questionnaire were involved, as well as a number of new respondents, 
chosen on the basis of their ability to provide the depth of knowledge 
needed based on their involvement in the sector. The researcher decided 
to conduct semi-structured interviews because interviews are a recognised 
survey method, and interviews thus fit within the researcher's chosen 
method. Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to prepare 
questions ahead of time, and are formal interviews, but also allow the 
researcher to stray off the strict questions and order thereof if need be, 
and provide room for respondents to express their views and opinions 
(Qualitative Research Guidelines Project, 2012). This was necessary 
given the nature of the subjects (experts within their field, not necessarily 
willing to follow the strict interview structure that other types of interviewing 
would require). 
 
The secondary research component involved completing a review of the 
documentation directly related to the LLU process as it has unfolded thus 
far, extracting qualitative data that identifies the views and reasoning of 
key stakeholders.   
 
The third question – How should policymakers exploit the opportunities 
and address the challenges that arise out of this? – is answered through 
the creation of a framework that policymakers can use to decide which 
form of unbundling, given a specific rationale and a stated definition, will 
likely lead to a specific type of competition.  
 
The framework is developed from the themes derived from comparing the 
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results of the study and the data derived from documentary sources with 
the academic literature within the context of a model developed by 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) and adapted by the researcher. In order to 
create this framework, the researcher took the data sets from the primary 
and secondary research projects and compared them, using the factors 
outlined in the adapted Hausman and Sidak (2005) model, in order to 
establish what impact LLU has on competition in the local market, the 
impact on entrants, the incumbent and consumers, and to draw 
conclusions around how these impacts must be taken into account by 
policymakers when drafting unbundling policies. 
3.5 Data sources 
The first and second questions – how does LLU impact competition in a 
market and what effect does it have on incumbents, new entrants and 
consumers – were answered through the primary and secondary research 
phases.  
3.5.1 Primary research – survey and indepth interviews 
As is typical in a survey, the researcher selected a sample of respondents 
and administered a standard questionnaire to each (Babbie & Mouton, 
2001, p231), via e-mail in the questionnaire portion, and then either face to 
face or telephonically for the interview portion.  
 
The questionnaires consist of questions directly related to the rationales 
for and types of unbundling, and the types of competition that result. 
Respondents were asked to give yes or no answers, to aid in the 
translating the data into a framework, although many provided 
commentary too (see attached questionnaire – Appendix B). 
 
The questionnaire was submitted to a selection of representatives from the 
second fixed line operator (Neotel), the Internet Service Providers 
Association, consumer advocacy website My Broadband and several new 
entrants – Cell C, MWeb, Internet Solutions, and Vox Telecom, see 
Appendix A. 
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Eight participants from seven organisations responded to the initial 
questionnaire (others did not respond within the given timeframe) and 
eleven participants were interviewed (with some overlap between the two 
groups), additional experts having been included in order to broaden the 
pool of views, see Appendix A. These additional experts were drawn from 
ICASA, the University of the Witwatersrand, Cell C, Africa Analysis and 
Vodacom.  
 
In surveys the subjects either fill in the responses themselves or the 
responses are filled in by the researcher. In this study the respondents 
filled in the questionnaires themselves, while the researcher wrote up the 
interview responses. 
 
Once the questionnaires were complete the researcher collated and 
categorised them according to the broad themes into which the questions 
could be categorised – type of LLU, rationale for LLU or impact on 
competition. By recording the answers by type (yes, yes with comment, no 
or no with comment), the researcher could then add up the answers to 
provide a majority view on each question.. This provided a broad overview 
of what market players consider the rationales for LLU to be, what they 
understand the types of LLU to be and what types of competition were 
likely to result, but was not sufficient to draw up a framework that would be 
of use to policymakers. 
 
The researcher then conducted semi-structured interviews, using a series 
of questions specifically designed to extract comment on how 
implementing LLU would affect the players in the market, competition in 
the market and the market overall (see Appendix D - Information Sheet, 
Consent Form and Interview Questions).  
 
The interviews were semi-structured, conducted telephonically, for the 
main, due to the geographic dispersion of researcher and respondents, 
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and the busy schedules of all of the respondents. The semi-structured 
interview questions were specifically constructed to elicit more 
comprehensive feedback than had been obtained by the questionnaires.   
 
Following the completion of the interviews, transcripts were prepared and  
and by using a process of categorisation the researcher translated the 
responses into a set of factors formatted as definite statements, for 
example: “LLU will increase competition in the retail space”. In 
categorising the responses the researcher organised similar responses, 
and eliminated responses that were unsubstantiated opinions. 
 
The findings obtained from the primary research are arranged as they 
relate to three specific factors outlined in the amended Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) model  – rationales for LLU, types of LLU and types of 
competition likely to result after a LLU exercise – and were contrasted with 
the themes and perspectives derived from the literature review.  
3.5.2 Secondary research – document analysis 
In sourcing and selecting documentation to review with a view to extracting 
data to be added to the framework for LLU, the researcher reviewed 
documents on the LLU process published by the policymaker, regulator 
and industry players responding to requests for input from ICASA.  
 
In Chapter 4, the data collected in the research phase is contrasted with 
the academic literature reviewed in Chapter 2, and this lays the foundation 
for the data analysis conducted in Chapter 5. The academic literature used 
was extracted from the literature review in the Chapter 2 of this research 
report. Only that literature which could be categorised according to the 
factors outlined in the amended Hausman and Sidak (2005) model was 
used – ie that related to a definition of, rationales for and types of LLU, 
and the types of competition likely to result from a LLU implementation.  
 
In selecting documentation from the policymaker, the researcher reviewed 
the Local Loop Unbundling Committee Report (2007) commissioned by 
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Minister of Communications Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri. It was intended to 
provide everything the regulator would need to unbundle, but, as noted in 
Chapter 4, it has barely been referenced in the latest stage of the process, 
save by some of the operators. Certainly neither the Department of 
Communications nor ICASA has used it as a reference. 
 
With respect to documentation from the regulator, the researcher reviewed 
the Local Loop Unbundling Discussion Document published by ICASA on 
22 June 2011. This outlined ICASA's approach, and asked stakeholders to 
provide input on a number of matters. Industry input came from the 
responses that this request elicited. The researcher was able to locate 12 
submissions from a number of stakeholders – Neotel, Telkom, trade 
unions the Communication Workers Union, Solidarity and the South 
African Communications Union, consumer activist MyBroadband, private 
individual Paul Hjul, and a number of ISPs/VANS and mobile operators.  
 
In presenting the findings in Chapter 4, the findings from the documentary 
analysis are presented in general terms, before the primary research 
findings. The academic literature is contrasted directly with the primary 
findings as they relate to three specific factors outlined in the amended 
Hausman and Sidak's (2005) model. The literature is used purely for 
contrast, not analysis, and lays the foundation for analysis of the data in 
Chapter 5. 
3.5.3 Drawing up a Framework 
To answer the main question, the researcher utilised the data gathered 
from the primary and secondary research phases to develop a Framework 
for Local Loop Unbundling. This Framework draws on the clear themes 
that emerge across all of the data. The data in the findings chapter is 
arranged based on the factors outlined in the model developed by 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) and amended by the researcher. The analysis 
of these findings and the significance thereof is detailed indepth in the 
chapter that follows the presentation of the findings.  
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3.6 Delimitations 
This research deals exclusively with LLU as a policy intervention intended 
to stimulate competition in the provision of telecommunications services 
and infrastructure. It does not deal with other policy interventions designed 
to achieve the same aims.  
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher outlined the research project undertaken, 
and provided details pertaining to the research purpose, methodology, 
data sources, and delimitations. The researcher conducted a social 
research study into an aspect of the telecommunications sector that has 
real world applicability to the respondents. Both primary and second 
research techniques were used. Qualitative research was conducted 
because it allows a researcher to study an matter even though there are 
few subjects (Neuman, 1991: p13), it allows for thematic analysis 
(Neuman, 1991: p13) and enables the researcher to address evaluative 
questions (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994: p307), to extract textual rather than 
numerical data, and to capture and discover meaning (Neuman, 1991: 
p157). Two research methods were utilised – surveys and interviews, and 
document analysis. Once both were complete the researcher used the 
findings to design a framework for policymaking.
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Chapter 4 Contemplating the impact of LLU on competition 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In collecting data for analysis of the local environment, both primary and 
secondary sources were used. This chapter begins with a documentary 
analysis of the Local Loop Unbundling Report produced by the Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee, which was meant to guide South Africa's LLU 
implementation. This is followed by documentary analysis of the 
stakeholder submissions to the most recent LLU process, conducted by 
the regulator in 2011. Thereafter the researcher comments on the Local 
Loop Unbundling Framework published by ICASA as an outcome of this 
process.   
 
The researcher then presents the findings from a stakeholder survey and 
semi-structured interviews presented in a format specific to the adapted 
Hausman and Sidak model. All three sets of results are compared, for 
validation purposes.  
4.2 Regulating LLU 
4.2.1 Local Loop Unbundling Committee recommendations on LLU 
The report prepared by the Local Loop Unbundling Committee (2007) 
which is meant to guide South Africa's implementation of LLU, is widely 
known to have been plagiarised from a 2003 OECD report (OECD, 
'Developments in Local Loop Unbundling', published September 2003). It 
is very clumsily written, as if its authors were writing about a topic they'd 
heard of but weren't particularly familiar with. Phrases like: “In spite of the 
telecommunication services to be offered, the main difference between the 
incumbent and the new entrant is that the incumbent already has a very 
widespread fixed line infrastructure for both national and international 
connectivity, while the new entrants do not have any” (Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee, 2007: p2), is indicative of both the stilted writing 
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style and very basic understanding of the matter.  
 
The real difference is that the incumbent has had years, and a monopoly 
environment, in which to build a network and a customer base while the 
entrant hasn't had either. LLU intends to stimulate competition by 
redressing this imbalance through enabling other players to use 
incumbents' infrastructure rather than building their own (Baranes & 
Bourreau, 2005; Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007; OECD, 2003; 
Sutherland 2007). 
 
The report's writers appear to discount entirely the impact mobile network 
operators have had on the sector. For example, they state that Telkom's 
customer base is 47 percent business and 53 percent residential and that, 
as business customers account for 75 percent of its revenue, opportunities 
for growth exist in the SME and government sectors. But, they say: “Other 
segments like residential and the top business customer have been 
experiencing decreasing growth compelling Telkom South Africa to 
seriously market ADSL and be prepared to put forward WIMAX and 
Internet based television” (Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007: p4), 
without considering what the reasons for the decreasing growth are, and 
that aggressive marketing or introducing new products and services may 
not solve the problem. 
 
The report asserts that unbundling the local loop will place “strong 
downward pressure on tariffs for high speed voice and data services and 
diminish significantly the cost of Internet access” (Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee, 2007: p4) without providing comment on how this will happen 
or data to support this assertion.  
 
The authors admit that the report was written based on information derived 
from desktop research and case studies from the US and Europe. Little 
primary research appears to have been done and few experts consulted, 
at local, regional or international level though South Africa has access to 
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experts in country, in SADC, and internationally at the ITU.  
 
The authors repeatedly refer to the ICT market in contexts which make it 
clear they do not understand the significance of the I and the T in the 
acronym. For example, “The introduction of the SNO and the freeing up of 
the ICT market” (Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007: p4). The IT 
market has never been subject to capture, not in the sense the authors 
seem to mean in any event. Such basic errors are common throughout the 
report and make the reader question just how much research the writers 
did, and what level of academic rigour was applied to that research. 
 
The report refers to the legalisation of “the international VOIP” (Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee, 2007: p5), and states that this is a ground for 
competition between Telkom and the SNO and the basis for a duopoly 
between them, neglecting entirely to mention the VANS providers (some 
500 of them), which can and do provide VoIP services, both locally, 
nationally and internationally, and have done since 2005. 
 
Puzzlingly, the report makes the assumption that the local loop 
infrastructure will be split into a separate organisation ala BT Openreach 
(Local Loop Unbundling Committee, 2007: p39), which has been 
functionally separated from the larger BT organisation, without supplying 
any detail on what led it to make that assumption or why it recommends 
this approach.   
 
The report does provide a comprehensive outline of the technologies 
involved, the complexities of co-location, the role of the regulator and the 
expected impact on the incumbent.  
 
The report mentions only three types of LLU – full unbundling, line-sharing 
and bitstream – and does not consider sub-loop unbundling (Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee, 2007: pix) in its introduction, but mentions sub 
loop as a subset of bitstream in its explanation of each type (Local Loop 
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Unbundling Committee, 2007: p21).   
 
The LLU Committee's stated rationales for LLU are: 
 [to] facilitate telecommunication providers to innovate and 
 differentiate their product offerings; promote competition in the 
 provision of broadband services; offer opportunities for innovation to 
 drive product and price differentiation; permit providers to give a 
 better choice of applications and improved service levels; allow 
 customer to have alternatives in terms of telecommunication 
 services and price; speed up national economic growth and 
 increase competitiveness in the global market; and support ICT in 
 the country and hence promote economic and social growth in 
 addition to employment opportunities (Local Loop Unbundling 
 Committee, 2007: p3). 
 
The report does not delve specifically into the types of competition that 
could result from each type of unbundling. It states that: “new entrants 
would like to compete in this space to provide data communications 
services and broadband access to customers” (Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee, 2007: p2), which is retail competition. The competition 
scenario illustrated further on in the report (Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee, 2007: p5) again specifies consumer market – retail – 
competition. The report's authors clearly have not considered that 
platform, facilities-based or wholesale competition could result from an 
unbundling exercise.   
4.2.2 Stakeholder submissions on LLU 2011 
The LLU process in South Africa kicked off (after a hiatus of three years) 
with the publication of a discussion paper on LLU by ICASA on 22 June 
2011 (Local Loop Unbundling Discussion Paper, ICASA, 2011a). It does 
not pay much attention to the Local Loop Unbundling Committee's Report, 
despite said report laying out how LLU should be implemented. The 
Marwala Report, as it is known, after the Local Loop Unbundling 
Committee chairperson, has barely received a mention since the new 
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process kicked off. 
  
ICASA's discussion document lays out the legislative background to South 
Africa's open access approach to telecommunications, as well as detailing 
the four types of unbundling. It asked interested parties for input on 
whether its approach to unbundling the local loop via the facilities leasing 
regulations was feasible, reasonable and acceptable; which type of 
unbundling the market preferred; cost items that should be included; 
whether a standard set of specifications and ordering system was needed 
and whether or not players would be willing to contribute to an access line 
deficit (ALD) recovery scheme should an access line deficit be discovered 
(ICASA, 2011a: p2). An access line deficit occurs when the revenue 
received from line rental and service provision does not cover the cost of 
said rental and service. 
 
The document requested comment from stakeholders to be submitted by  
22 September, which left the regulator very little time to meet the  
November 2011 deadline originally set by late Minister Ivy Matsepe-
Casaburri.  
 
Following the submission of comments, public hearings were held, which 
allowed stakeholders to present their submissions to the regulator. As can 
be seen from the data below, the submissions vary widely both in the 
depth of understanding of the matter at hand, and the proposals on how 
the regulator should tackle LLU. 
4.2.2.1 Broadband InfraCo 
By it's own admission, infrastructure provider Broadband InfraCo (2011) 
does not play in the fixed or mobile market and has no direct interest in 
LLU. It does believe LLU will increase competition and thus improve its 
economies of scale due to the higher volumes of traffic it expects will 
result. The company considers LLU to be naked ADSL (which is a digital 
line without any voice functionality), which is technically incorrect. The 
company concurs with ICASA that the facilities leasing regulations enable 
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LLU but says that the fact that LLU has not happened yet indicates the 
regulations are not efficient.  
 
It has no preference for a particular type of LLU but wants ICASA to 
ensure that under-investment in the loop does not result. It is positing an 
open access model that includes access to facilities like ducts and points 
of presence and says that full unbundling may be the only way to achieve 
this. It wants ICASA to include the cost of upgrading or replacing the local 
loop in its cost considerations. It is supportive of an access line deficit 
recovery scheme but comments that this should not be open-ended and 
that it must be transparent and not constitute a barrier to entry. 
4.2.2.2 Cell C  
Mobile network operator Cell C (2011) raises concerns around procedural 
issues (inconsistencies between the media statement announcing the 
framework, the discussion document itself and information provided in a 
meeting it held with the regulator), and informational issues (noting that 
the working groups to deal with pricing and technical issues as posited in 
the discussion document will not achieve much without technical and 
financial audit information of Telkom's exchanges, electronic facilities 
information and subscriber information).  
 
Cell C (2011) recommends that the regulator use the Marwala Report to 
guide the LLU process but does not state why it makes this 
recommendation. It notes that it does not believe the wireless local loop 
should be unbundled, which is not surprising given the investment it is 
making in rolling out such a network at the moment. 
 
4.2.2.3 Communication Workers Union (CWU) 
Trade union, the Communications Workers Union (2011) notes that LLU is 
a very costly exercise, which requires coordination between the incumbent 
and new entrants on a number of processes, and that agreement is 
needed on a number of things – like pricing, colocation and spectrum 
management. It believes such costs will be offset by operators cutting 
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costs in other areas – like labour.  
 
LLU, it states, represents a threat to national security.  Different types of 
communication are at risk of being intercepted despite legal protections 
and despite there only being one player with access to the network, it says 
This view suggests that that it does not understand how telephony, e-mail 
and other communications take place over any given communications 
system. Extending access to different network elements to different 
service providers, the Communications Workers Union (2011) believes, 
will increase the risks. 
 
The Communications Workers Union (2011) says that because the 
network does not extend to poor or rural areas, citizens in townships and 
rural areas will not benefit from LLU and competition will be restricted to 
urban and business districts. 
 
The Communications Workers Union (2011) regards technical 
interoperability (or the lack thereof) to be a threat to the process, stating 
additionally that the technological co-operation of incumbents and entrants 
may need to be provided for by technical specifications that do not yet 
exist. It is advocating technology neutrality as a remedy to this. 
 
The Communications Workers Union (2011) notes that the timing of LLU is 
a little late as the incumbent is no longer the dominant player in the sector, 
a view Telkom (2011) has also espoused. 
4.2.2.4 Paul Hjul 
Private individual Paul Hjul (2011) states that he has no interest in the 
sector other than as a user of communications products and services. Hjul 
(2011) believes that if LLU is enabled under the facilities leasing 
regulations then ICASA has no option but to implement them. He says the 
problem in the regulatory environment relates to failure by ICASA to 
“tackle certain ICT players head on”. He says consumers want “value for 
money and quality service”, and that as all forms of unbundling are 
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mandated the Authority should go ahead and make sure LLU is 
implemented. He suggests bitstream and sub-loop unbundling be 
prioritised, because bitstream allows for quick wins, and sub-loop will drive 
fibre roll outs thus mitigating the effects of the inevitable cherry-picking of 
profitable exchanges that is going to happen. 
4.2.2.5 Internet Service Providers Association 
The Internet Service Providers Association (2011) references the open 
access approach, and comments that, with that in mind, the LLU process 
cannot restrict itself to copper lines. It argues for taking a broader 
approach and including media like radio frequency and fibre, as well as 
copper, in the unbundling process so that the process results in the 
establishment of principles that can apply to any media. The technicalities 
of unbundling various access media should be left to industry working 
groups, it comments, while requesting that the Authority broaden the 
scope of the process underway.  
  
The Internet Service Providers Association (2011) states that the 
increased competition and lower costs further up the telecommunications 
value chain (for example in submarine cables) are not being felt by 
consumers due to the limited number of players in the last mile, and that 
LLU is critical to reducing broadband prices, as a result. 
 
It further notes that mobile broadband is not a substitute for fixed, that this 
issue is not relevant within the unbundling discussion and that the 
existence of a wireless broadband market is no reason not to fix market 
failures in the fixed-line market. 
 
It expresses concern that pricing is not addressed in the discussion 
document, citing the recent failed implementation of carrier pre-select 
(which has been stymied by the monopoly operator putting high prices in 
place in the absence of regulations to guide cost-setting). The Internet 
Service Providers Association (2011) states that unless wholesale pricing 
is regulated, the entire LLU exercise will be pointless. 
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4.2.2.6 MyBroadband 
Consumer activist and publisher MyBroadband (2011) says consumers are 
faced with both “a lack of service offerings and predatory pricing” due to 
systemic failure with regards to the implementation of the Electronic 
Communications Act. It agrees with the regulator that LLU is enabled by 
the facilities leasing regulations. A poll conducted on the MyBroadband 
site saw 90% of users expressing a preference for full unbundling. A 
phased approach is also preferred, starting with bitstream and line-sharing 
and moving up to full unbundling. The group has requested that the 
Authority review the access line deficit to investigate how it is calculated. 
Consumers do not want the access line deficit recovery fee to either be 
used to substitute for revenue lost to LLU or subsidise inefficiency.  
 
The group, like Telkom, feels that mobile and other access networks 
should be included in unbundling. MyBroadband (2011) says maintenance 
and upgrading the loop may be an issue once it is unbundled and that the 
Authority needs to specify clearly defined service levels and enforce such.    
4.2.2.7 MWeb 
VANS MWeb (2011) concurs with and supports ICASA's goals (as laid out 
in the framework), and says that additionally, it believes LLU will result in 
job creation, increase competition and improve the customer experience in 
terms of broadband products and services.  
 
It believes that while LLU will go some way to remedying issues in the 
broadband market, short-term remedies are needed, specifically to 
address problems with Telkom IP Connect pricing, the quality of the IP 
Connect service, the lack of availability of Naked ADSL and lack of access 
to the wholesale wireless network (in other words it agrees with the 
Internet Service Providers Association and Telkom that wireless networks 
should also be unbundled). 
 
MWeb (2011) says that ICASA should subsidise organisations that invest 
in last mile infrastructure, with funding from the Universal Service Fund, 
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with the infrastructure being made available to all on an open access basis 
(or no subsidy be issued).  
 
The company acknowledges the complexity of, costs involved with and 
lengthy time periods needed to properly implement LLU and recommends 
a phased roll out.  
4.2.2.8 Neotel 
Second network operator Neotel (2011) supports efforts to unbundle the 
local loop, stating that, among other things, unbundling results in 
increased innovation, job creation, reduced prices, investment increases 
and facilities competition. It believes LLU should be restricted to the 
copper fixed-line loop, that all four options should be implemented, and 
that an Ordering Specifications System is very important. It does not 
support an access line deficit charge.  
 
Neotel (2011) believes LLU gives an entrant an opportunity to get to know 
the market, to become familiar with customer expectations and build a 
brand and customer trust before embarking on its own roll-outs. It refers to 
Martin Cave's ladder of investment theory (Cave, 2006), citing case 
studies where operators in Norway, Sweden and Denmark took advantage 
of unbundled loops to expand infrastructure into other geographical 
territories. It says LLU will reduce prices in part because in South Africa up 
to 77% of the cost of an ADSL service goes to Telkom by way of its IP 
Connect product, which is what connects other providers to Telkom's 
network. Telkom does not use the public Internet like other service 
providers in South Africa do.  
 
Neotel (2011) says Telkom has a number of options which it can 
implement to counter-act any losses it experiences due to LLU, including 
launching new retail products, differentiating its offerings, partnering new 
entrants and developing “attractive wholesale offerings” (Neotel, 2011: 
p14). 
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4.2.2.9 Solidarity 
Trade union Solidarity (2011) says it finds ICASA's “attempted ex-ante 
regulation premature” (Solidarity, 2011: p1). It states there is no research 
to prove that LLU will result in greater competition or lower prices, and is 
not certain that there is enough demand for broadband to justify an 
unbundling exercise. It comments that there is increasing evidence that 
less regulation may be needed in terms of retail pricing and LLU, and more 
needed in terms of spectrum allocation, particularly for the supply of 
broadband services into the small office, home office and residential 
market.  
 
It argues that wireless technology offers a fixed line substitute and that 
“scarce regulatory resources” would be better used for frequency spectrum 
allocation (Solidarity, 2011: p2). The trade union asserts that as so few 
households (17%, according to Statistics South Africa, as quoted by the 
union) have fixed lines only urban users stand to gain from LLU.  
 
It says government's shareholding in the incumbent is “surely contrary” to 
its universal access objectives (Solidarity, 2011: p1). It says jobs will be 
lost if LLU is implemented, quoting figures from Telkom, which state that 
LLU will cost it between R159m to R850m and result in lost revenue 
amounting to R466,4m over five years. Solidarity is proposing bitstream 
unbundling as a means to open up the sector while not having the same 
“technical and practical drawbacks” (Solidarity, 2011: p3). It concurs with 
Telkom that LLU should apply to all communications licensees, including 
mobile network operators. 
4.2.2.10 South African Communications Union (SACU) 
The South African Communications Union (SACU) (2011) says the 
discussion document does not “set the context for the detailed questions 
which it poses”, commenting that it “lacks something of an overarching 
narrative” (SACU, 2011, p1).  
 
It says 15 years of competition in the sector have not been hugely 
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successful and that competition has not resulted in better pricing or 
service quality, although consumers have much more choice. It criticises 
the policy of encouraging network competition as having led to 
infrastructure duplication and little innovation plus huge job losses. ICASA 
has not always produced detailed regulations and this has cost the 
industry, it states. It says there is a “lack of regulatory strategy” (Solidarity, 
2011: p2). It outlines a set of broad principles that it thinks should shape 
and underly telecoms regulation going forward: 
 LLU Regulation should take account of the interests of those who 
 work in the industry and the need to work with trade unions to 
 secure skills and training at the highest levels and promote decent 
 labor standards and practices throughout the ITC industry; 
 LLU Regulation should support the delivery of the strategic needs of 
 South African public in as a whole (sic); 
 LLU Regulation should focus less on attempting to promote network 
 competition, but more on securing the necessary investment in the 
 network designed to facilitate universal access and the production 
 for new innovative products and services (sic); 
 LLU Regulation should be based on telecommunications as a 
 global market and not simply a South African one; 
 LLU Regulation should be less telecommunications sector specific 
 and more generic with more reliance on competition act (sic) and 
 move towards a strategic model that promotes investment, 
 innovation and development in the network; 
 LLU Regulation should be less tactical and intrusive and more 
 strategic and enabling; 
 LLU Regulation must deliver effective funding arrangements for 
 universal access to ever-increasing bandwidths speeds (sic) and 
 ensure that minimum standards on quality of service are maintained 
 throughout the ITC sector; 
 LLU Regulation should be less mechanistic and more humanistic, 
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 empowering workers in the ITC sector and creating sustainable 
 employment; 
 LLU Regulation should take account of the interests of those who 
 work in the industry and not the exclusive interest that of business 
(sic) (SACU, 2011: p3). 
SACU notes that LLU will be technically and organisationally difficult to 
define and implement. It would also delay broadband roll outs, it asserts, 
as South Africa is now doing well in broadband terms (it does not define 
'well' or say who South Africa is doing well in relation to) thanks to Telkom 
and that LLU would disrupt this as well as result in “innumerable” job 
losses (SACU, 2011: p5).  
 
It states that LLU has never worked anywhere and that ICASA is headed 
into shaky territory, and introducing LLU would be a “betrayal of investors, 
customers and employees – for no good reason” (SACU, 2011: p6). 
4.2.2.11 Telkom  
Monopoly incumbent Telkom (2011) expresses numerous concerns about 
LLU in its submission. It says LLU is outdated and not suited for 
developing countries that do not have high levels of fixed-line teledensity.  
 
As mentioned by Solidarity (2011), Telkom (2011) prescribes to the 
principles of open access to the loop and believes said principles should 
be applied to all licensees, including mobile network providers. It says 
conditions specific to South Africa, like the concentration of revenue in a 
few profitable exchanges, means LLU poses a threat. It states that LLU is 
costly, and complicated, as international case studies have shown, and it 
wants any costs to unbundle the local loop to be funded by access 
seekers, and not Telkom.  
 
It comments that it is unclear how “LLU will promote South Africa's 
developmental agenda” (Telkom, 2011: p3). It believes LLU is contrary to 
that policy, and, further, that it does not support government's universal 
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service and access or job creation goals. It says LLU will negatively impact 
both network roll outs and employment.  
 
In addition to the substantive challenges, it challenges the Authority on 
procedural issues too (in great detail, and at length), stating that it is 
incorrect “in law” for ICASA to be using the Minister's 2007 Policy Decision 
as a policy framework for LLU (Telkom, 2011: p4). It also does not believe 
the facilities leasing regulations enable the unbundling of the loop, stating 
that “the Authority's reliance on its facilities leasing regulations is flawed in 
law and open to legal challenges” (Telkom, 2011: p4). It further states that 
ICASA has not followed the provisions of the ICASA  Act correctly in 
initiating the section 4B inquiry into LLU. 
 
Telkom (2011) makes the comment that there has been a lack of discourse 
on the subject, that ICASA has not “considered the implications and 
unintended consequences of LLU”(Telkom, 2011: p4). It notes that “Telkom 
believes the Authority should not proceed prior to having considered 
government's policy objectives, conducted a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment and having addressed Telkom's ALD” (Telkom, 2011: p4).  
 
It further notes that ICASA has outlined neither a rationale for nor any 
objectives of LLU, nor has it highlighted what benefits would accrue to the 
poor or those in under-serviced areas. It disputes ICASA's assertions that 
Telkom's network is under-utilised and that LLU will thus result in 
increased broadband penetration. It does not agree that LLU will secure 
jobs, nor does it agree that LLU represents a revenue-generation 
opportunity for Telkom, with potential new revenue of R1bn available to all 
operators, which could be used for network expansion. It further notes that 
ICASA has provided no data or evidence to back up its claims. 
4.2.2.12 Vodacom 
Mobile network operator Vodacom (2011) quite carefully and specifically 
states that it supports LLU, as set out in the Marwala Report ie, the 
unbundling of the copper line network owned by Telkom and located 
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between the subscriber's premises and the main distribution frame (MDF). 
It supports ICASA in its decision to use the facilities leasing regulations to 
enable LLU. Should ICASA wish to unbundle any loops not contemplated 
by the Local Loop Unbundling Committee (ie any loops that are not 
Telkom's copper loop), then an entirely new process, it believes, will need 
to be started.  
 
It believes that neither bitstream unbundling nor the wireless local loop are 
facilities that could be leased under the facilities leasing regulations, and a 
market review process will be needed before either can be introduced. It 
wants all four types of LLU to be made available, but notes that bitstream 
is a service not a facility and thus cannot be regulated in terms of the 
facilities leasing regulations. It requests that the Authority issue 
supplemental regulations to deal with practical matters such as ordering 
procedures, policies, colocation, rental arrangements and so on. 
 
Vodacom (2011) says the Local Loop Unbundling Discussion Document 
does not provide information around exchange location, lines, 
geographical coverage, condition of the copper lines, quality of the lines 
and other critical information, without which it cannot evaluate the viability 
and benefits of LLU. It recommends an audit be undertaken. It also 
recommends that a regulatory impact assessment be done to determine 
the “implications, benefits and costs associated with implementing LLU” 
(Vodacom, 2011: p7), and to help the Authority to determine if LLU will 
meet its objectives. Vodacom does not point out that the Authority has not 
stated its objectives. 
 
Vodacom raises a number of questions on the issue of the access line 
deficit (ALD), including asking how the ALD is defined in SA, how it came 
about, what the size of the ALD is, how it is calculated, what options are 
being considered to address it and if the ALD came about because of poor 
management or inefficiency. 
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4.2.3 ICASA's Determinations 
Following the oral presentation of the above submissions on 11 and 12 
October 2011, ICASA released its Local Loop Unbundling Framework on 
30 November 2011 (ICASA, 2011c), and did not give industry much hope 
that LLU would be implemented quickly or effectively. ICASA (2011)b has 
decided to implement LLU in a phased process. Having determined that 
there is an access line deficit (ie that Telkom charges less than it costs it to 
own and maintain its copper lines), it announced it was undertaking a 
public consultation process to establish an Access Line Deficit Recovery 
Scheme. This process was due to kick off in February 2012 but did not.  
 
ICASA (2011c) stated that it planned to “engage with industry” to ensure 
that the price of Telkom's IP Connect product (the cost it charges ISPs to 
interconnect their IP networks to its) was dropped (ICASA, 2011b: p3). It 
wanted this to happen by 31 March 2012. A 30 percent cut was 
announced on 4 April 2012 (Mochiko, 2012).  
 
Further, ICASA (2011c) planned to ensure that a bitstream product was 
introduced by 1 November 2012. A working group was going to be 
established in February 2012 to work out the technical issues and develop 
an Ordering System Specification. To the best of the author's knowledge 
this had not happened by early April 2013. 
 
ICASA (2011c) planned to conduct a regulatory impact assessment in mid-
2012 on the costs and benefits of the three other types of LLU – full, sub-
loop and line sharing. This has also not happened as far as the author is 
aware. Depending on the outcome of this process, ICASA (2011c) says, it 
will conduct a market review on the fixed line local access market with a 
view to introducing supplementary regulations.  
4.3 Rationales for LLU  
This research was conducted in several phases, the first involved 
secondary research into the documentation guiding South Africa's efforts 
in this regard, and the formal industry input into this process, as detailed 
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above. 
 
 As part of the second phase – where primary research was conducted – a 
survey was presented to eight local stakeholders, posing 24 questions on 
LLU and its expected impact on competition and pricing in the local 
market.  
 
Following on the survey, a series of interviews was done with an expanded 
panel of experts (11 participants in total). The semi-structured interview 
questions were structured to elicit more comprehensive feedback than had 
been obtained by the surveys. Respondents were selected for indepth 
interviews to provide the researcher with a more comprehensive view of 
the respondents' views and reasoning on the matters raised in the survey. 
LLU is a complicated topic and the questionnaire only scratches the 
surface of the issues at hand.  
 
Once respondents were selected and agreed to participate, telephonic and 
face to face interviews were conducted. The respondents' interview 
transcripts were then typed up, factors related to the rationales for LLU, 
types of LLU and types of competition were extracted, these were then 
collated, compared, de-duplicated (many of the respondents had stated 
the same or very similar things) and compiled into a set of factors related 
to the questions the researcher sought to answer. 
 
The findings of both data collection phases are presented below, 
categorised according to the amended Hausman and Sidak (2005) 
framework. These are directly contrasted with the academic literature, 
which is presented below.  
4.3.1 Data on rationales for LLU 
According to some of the survey respondents, a rationale for LLU is to give 
new/alternate entrants access to the incumbent's infrastructure. They say 
LLU should be implemented because it fosters competition in the market. 
LLU also provides a means to avoid the cost of duplicating fixed line 
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infrastructure, they note. 
 
The respondents believe LLU will enable the delivery of services to under-
served areas, and encourage broadband roll out. LLU, they maintain, also 
enables service-based competition, and will thus increase the return on 
investment on installed copper infrastructure and enable the copper 
network to be used efficiently. 
4.3.2 Contrasting perspectives on the rationales for LLU 
The most commonly cited rationales for LLU are to increase competition in 
the last mile and reduce costs (Christodolou & Vlahos, 2001; Rowe, 2001; 
Bourreau, 2002; De Bijl & Peitz, 2005).  
 
Intven (2000: p3-40) states that: “The purpose of unbundling policies is to 
lower economic and technical barriers to competitive entry.” 
 
According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), LLU has four major rationales: 
to promote retail competition; to remove entry barriers that prevent 
platform competition; as a stepping-stone to facilities-based competition; 
and to promote wholesale access market competition (Hausman & Sidak, 
2005, p173, 192). 
 
Other rationales include what is called the essential facilities doctrine 
(Gabelmann, 2001), which states that the local loop is an essential facility 
that cannot be easily duplicated. This concept is found in South Africa's 
law in the Electronic Communications Act of 2005. 
4.4 Types of LLU 
4.4.1 Data on types of LLU 
Full unbundling, according to the survey respondents, is the most 
expensive option for new entrants but gives new entrants the most control 
and the option to utilise new technology. Full unbundling, they note, is also 
complex and complicated. They comment that full unbundling will enable 
the introduction of innovative products and services as it gives entrants 
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access to the entire circuit. Further, the respondents say, full unbundling 
will have the biggest impact on the market because it enables players to 
introduce new technologies that enable advanced services. 
 
Sub-loop unbundling, according to the respondents, gives the facilities 
seeker access to the local loop from the streetbox. The facilities seeker 
has to invest in its own backhaul from there, they note. It is relatively low 
cost for the incumbent, they add, and sub-loop unbundling unbundles the 
line at the closest possible point to the subscriber. Sub-loop unbundling 
allows for shorter loops and thus faster bandwidths, they state. 
 
According to the respondents, line-sharing gives the new entrant access to 
the high frequency spectrum portion of the line over which to provide data 
services, while the incumbent retains the low frequency portion for voice 
services. It requires less investment from new entrants than full or sub-
loop unbundling, they comment, and allows the incumbent to retain voice 
revenues. 
 
Bitstream, the respondents say, is not a physical unbundle, nor a facilities 
share, it is a wholesale product that brings competition to the retail space. 
They comment that bitstream opens access to the incumbent's network at 
minimal cost to the new entrant/alternate carrier. Bitstream takes place 
furthest from the consumer and the required capital expenditure is 
significantly reduced but control over the product is reduced too, the 
respondents note. Bitstream lets new entrants access the incumbent's 
loop to deliver data traffic to consumers. 
4.4.2 Contrasting perspectives on types of LLU 
The OECD (2003: p7,8) states that full unbundling happens when the 
incumbent's copper is leased to a new entrant to use to offer services, and 
the incumbent ceases to provide services but still owns the infrastructure 
and has to maintain it.  
 
Line sharing gives the new entrant access to some of the copper pair so, 
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for example, the incumbent offers voice and the entrant offers broadband 
to the same consumer over the same (shared) line (OECD 2003, p7,8).  
 
Bitstream access gives entrants a wholesale xDSL product that they can 
resell to consumers – full control of the lines is retained by the incumbent 
(OECD 2003: p 7,8), meaning entrants are restricted by what the 
incumbent makes available to them. For example, if the incumbent only 
makes an ADSL product available then the entrants can only resell an 
ADSL product to consumers.   
 
Sub-loop unbundling occurs when the entrant connects to a point in the 
local loop (usually at the primacy connection point or street cabinet) on a 
full or shared basis. It is best suited to fibre to the curb environments 
where high-speed bandwidth connections are being provided 
(Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad & Tobago, 2009: p15). 
4.5 The impact of LLU on competition 
4.5.1 Data on the impact of LLU on competition 
The respondents and interviewees believe the impact on competition will 
be high. According to them, implementing any of the four types of LLU will 
result in increased retail competition. LLU, they maintain, fosters service-
based competition and it opens the fixed line market to competition in the 
retail space. LLU opens the market to new players and lets existing 
players grow, they comment, and should impact the price and variety of 
services and products available, but that depends on how it is costed. The 
respondents further concur that full unbundling, sub-loop unbundling or 
line-sharing will result in platform competition, but are equally divided on 
whether bitstream will or won't. The respondents are almost unanimous in 
believing that mandatory unbundling will result in facilities-based 
competition, whether it is full unbundling or sub-loop unbundling, only ISPA 
and Vox disagree. The respondents also agree that bitstream unbundling 
or line-sharing will not result in facilities-based competition. On wholesale 
access competition, all agree that LLU will further competition in this sector 
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of the market, irrespective of type of unbundling implemented.  
 
The respondents believe the impact on consumers will be high. The 
respondents concur that retail competition will occur without the imposition 
of mandatory unbundling. They further agree that LLU will result in lower 
prices for both consumers and new entrants, as well as encourage new 
players to enter the market and roll out their own infrastructure. All of these 
will have positive consequences for consumers and entrants and negative 
consequences for the incumbent. Some of the respondents noted that LLU 
will increase contractual complexity in the sector because of the nature 
and variety of agreements needed to govern the commercial 
arrangements. 
 
The impact of LLU on the fixed line market will depend on what type of 
LLU is implemented and how much longer it takes, some respondents 
noted. LLU will ultimately result in a deepening of the copper network in 
terms of subscribers, volumes and products as it will bring competition to 
the infrastructure space, and stimulate roll outs as demand increases, 
some respondents believe.  
 
LLU is costly for the incumbent, and the incumbent will lose market share 
and revenue, according to some of the respondents. LLU can also reduce 
the incentive for operators to roll out their own infrastructure if not priced 
correctly.  
4.5.2 Contrasting perspectives on the impact of LLU on competition 
According to de Bijl and Peitz (2005), LLU had still failed to give strong 
competition in the fixed line telephony front in Europe by 2005, with only 
6.5 percent of consumers using lines provided by entrants or unbundled 
lines provided by entrants in 2004. While unbundled loops hadn't been 
used by new entrants to roll out voice services, de Bijl and Peitz (2005) 
note these have been used to offer broadband offerings (by incumbents 
and entrants alike). They comment that while full unbundling hasn't 
achieved its aims, line sharing and bitstream unbundling initiatives have 
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overall been relatively successful in introducing competition in the voice 
arena, not necessarily via fixed lines though, but rather via newer 
technologies like voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP), and in introducing 
competition in the Internet access space.  
 
Dippon and Ware (2010: p2) are less positive:  
 Wholesale unbundling in some instances may have contributed to 
 increased competition. However, our analysis suggests that the 
 apparent association between unbundling and increased broadband 
 penetration is not statistically significant when relevant economic, 
 demographic and supply determinants are included in the analysis. 
 As communications networks converge and the demand for wireline 
 services decreases globally, intermodal competition is more 
 prevalent and the benefits of unbundling are more difficult to 
 assess, and unbundling arguably becomes a regulatory tool of the 
 past. Given the dynamic nature of the communications industry, the 
 costs and the risks of implementing mandatory unbundling, and the 
 international differences in geographic, demographic, and market 
 conditions, policy makers should use a case-by-case approach that 
 carefully examines the contours of the relevant market(s) at issue 
 as well as the costs and benefits of any regulatory intervention. 
 
Facilities-based competition is the ultimate long term goal of LLU 
interventions, as facilities-based competition, says Oftel (as cited by 
Bourreau and Doğan (2005: p174)), provides the needed level of 
innovation and product diversity to meet consumer needs. As a prelude to 
this roll out, LLU provides a gap in which the entrant can provide services 
to generate income to use to invest in a network. They say this often 
doesn't happen, however, due to the pricing of the access loop, which 
results in delays in rolling out networks and new entrants falling behind, 
technologically speaking. 
 
The terms and price of an unbundled loop affect the viability of operations 
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in that market (Baranes & Bourreau, 2005: p19). If prices are too high or 
conditions unfavourable, entrants will stay away, which illustrates the 
complexity of an unbundling exercise, and the need for an informed and 
highly-involved regulator.  
 
Bourreau and Doğan (2005), argue that incumbent operators are 
incentivised to price local loops below cost in order to encourage new 
entrants to use said loops and only compete on a services basis, and not 
on a facilities basis. This, they say, impacts the building out of alternative 
technologies. 
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2004: p3) note that the general idea is that LLU will open 
the market and serve as a means to “deal with persistent network 
monopolies” but that LLU discourages entrants from innovating or rolling 
out their own networks and should, at some point, be withdrawn once 
competition has matured.  
 
According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), retail competition is a frequent 
rationale for mandatory unbundling, because it is believed that retail 
competition is a good thing, that incumbent operators prefer their own 
downstream affiliates (meaning natural market forces would thus not 
deliver retail competition without mandatory LLU), and that natural 
competition is inhibited by entry barriers.  
 
In the five country case studies conducted by Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
retail prices dropped in only one country (Germany), in all others pricing 
went up, and investment by incumbents dropped, providing inconclusive 
evidence for the influence of LLU on retail competition. 
 
A case study on Cyprus' liberalisation efforts conducted by Symeou (2009) 
reveals that four years after LLU the incumbent still held 97 percent of 
fixed national call and 87 percent of international call revenues, and that 
while 27 new fixed line operators had been licensed, few had made any 
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impact in the market (Symeou, 2009, p221).  
 
Bourreau's 2002 review of France's LLU process revealed that only 800 
lines had been unbundled, and that of 27 operators that participated in 
trials, only eight had signed unbundling contracts (Bourreau, 2002, p19). 
He notes that services-based competition had barely been affected, but 
infrastructure-based had taken off, with some 169 000 broadband 
subscribers in the country in 2001 (Bourreau, 2002: p19). 
 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) point out that access-based competition is 
seen as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition (which is highly 
desirable), and that this has become a rationale for mandatory LLU, ie that 
facilities-based competition is enabled by it. The expectation is that by 
allowing new entrants to use an incumbent's infrastructure it enables them 
to earn revenue, which they can then use to build their own facilities. As 
the authors point out, however, this is generally not the case, and the five 
country case studies conducted found “no evidence to support” the theory 
(Hausman & Sidak, 2005: p243). 
 
According to the accepted theory, LLU will promote wholesale competition, 
as Hausman and Sidak (2005) note. New entrants building their own 
facilities means new players entering the market in the future would not be 
solely reliant on incumbents' unbundled network elements, while 
simultaneously resulting in lower pricing of said elements, which would 
theoretically result in lower prices for consumers. The case studies 
conducted by Hausman and Sidak (2005) revealed some form (albeit very 
slight in one case) of wholesale competition had arisen in three of the 
countries, while it had not in the other two, but that there was a lack of 
wholesale players in the market. 
 
According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), consumers are meant to benefit 
from unbundling because regulation theoretically results in lower retail 
prices. Regulation, in a dynamic market, say Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
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impacts the return on investment in network infrastructure by new entrants 
and incumbents, and risks reducing it because incumbents are forced to 
let new entrants use their infrastructure, and new entrants have no 
motivation to build out their own infrastructure while they have access to 
the incumbent's.  
 
According to Hausman and Sidak (2005) another major rationale for 
mandatory LLU is that entry barriers inhibit platform competition. Simply 
put, factors like the cost of investing in a new network, achieving 
economies of scale, and being able to operate and compete with an 
incumbent while trying to achieve said network roll out and economies of 
scope and scale were seen to be huge barriers to entry to new entrants, 
and mandatory LLU is seen as a means to remedy this. Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) refute this, based on their case studies, citing competition in 
the cable market in many countries in the absence of mandatory 
unbundling. 
  
Hausman and Sidak (2005), considered LLU in five countries – the US, 
UK, Germany, Canada and New Zealand – with the intention of 
determining if unbundling did what it was intended to do. In each case, the 
outcome wasn't certain, with only Germany showing clear price reductions 
since the introduction of LLU, and then, as the authors note, competition 
from mobile networks had started to result in price decreases in any event. 
4.6 Summary 
While the debate in South Africa has centred on the need to introduce 
retail competition, the debate in other countries, such as the five selected 
by Hausman and Sidak (2005) for their study, dealt with the complexity of 
stimulating competition in the wholesale, platform, facilities and retail 
segments of the market.  
South Africa's debate on LLU has centred on a specific desired outcome - 
the need to make telecommunications services available to the entire 
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population - while in the US, UK, Germany, Canada and New Zealand a 
variety of rationales motivated each unbundling exercise. The major 
rationales identified by Hausman and Sidak (2005) are that mandatory 
unbundling promotes wholesale access market competition, that LLU is a 
stepping-stone to facilities-based competition, that LLU removes entry 
barriers to platform competition and that competition in retail markets 
cannot be achieved without unbundling. Only the latter has received 
substantial attention in South Africa, as shown by its prominence in the 
Local Loop Unbundling Committee report (2007), and the responses and 
comments given by the respondees and interviewees. 
Chapter 5 Cost, complexity and control as factors 
influencing the application of LLU 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the researcher presents an analysis of the data, leading to 
the design of a Framework for Local Loop Unbundling. The aim of this 
research was to develop this framework, utilising the factors identified by 
the expert respondents, using the amended Hausman and Sidak (2005) 
model as a basis for comparison, and using the data extracted from 
documentary sources to inform the design. The framework is intended to 
be of use to the South African government and possibly also to 
governments in other developing countries in exploiting the opportunities 
and overcoming the challenges inherent in a LLU exercise.  
 
Given the problems and challenges raised by many authors (including De 
Bijl & Peitz (2004 & 2005); Bourreau & Dogan (2005); Baranes & Bourreau 
(2005); Hausman & Sidak (2005); Symeou (2009); Dippon & Ware (2010))  
it is not clear whether LLU should be attempted in South Africa. Very little 
research has been done on the use of LLU to unplug the last mile access 
bottleneck in developing markets, which have only recently reached the 
stage of market liberalisation where regulatory interventions to stimulate 
competition are being considered.  
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There has been very little conclusive research into whether or not LLU can 
increase competition in a developing market. This question is important for 
policymakers and regulators who tend to believe that the de facto outcome 
of a LLU exercise is increased competition. If this is not in fact so, many 
policies and approaches will need to be revisited.  
 
It is perhaps pertinent to note that the discourse on LLU in South Africa 
has been lacking – both in quantity and quality. This is relevant because it 
goes some way to explaining how some players (including the 
policymaker) do not understand even the basics, as evinced by the 
Marwala Report and by the submissions presented earlier in this chapter 
as well as the information contained in their documentation, submissions 
and interviews. 
 
It is considered in the local market that LLU will de facto result in 
increased competition, but very little evidence to that effect is presented in 
the public presentations and submissions made by the players, or in any of 
the regulations (draft or otherwise) published by the regulator. Certainly 
nothing has been published by the Ministry of Communications to that 
effect.  
 
Very little has been said as to exactly how LLU will increase competition. 
Comments like this one from a TechCentral story are indicative of the level 
of discourse in the media: “Siyabonga Madyibi, executive for regulatory 
affairs at Internet Solutions, says the service provider hopes bitstream 
access, which allows other operators wholesale access to Telkom‟s “last 
mile” of copper, is comprehensively addressed” (Wilson C, 2011). 
Bitstream unbundling happens much further up the line than at the last 
mile, and isn't actually an unbundling at all, something neither the 
journalist nor service provider appear to be aware of. 
 
Another TechCentral piece quotes Vodacom managing executive for 
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regulatory affairs, Pakamile Pongwana as saying, at the LLU hearings, 
that “...these regulations could not be used to regulate wireless services. It 
also said the regulations could not be used to introduce “bitstream” 
access, one of the unbundling models proposed by ICASA in an earlier 
discussion document” (McLeod, 2011). In neither instance does Vodacom 
or the journalist say 'why', however. Later in the same piece Vodacom is 
quoted as saying that operators should use whichever of the four models 
posited by ICASA that they prefer, in direct contradiction to its earlier 
statement, quoted above. 
 
Telkom's stance has been defensive, as shown in a Brainstorm piece by 
this author which quotes a 'Telkom spokesperson', “It does not make 
economic sense to single out Telkom, with less than ten percent of market 
share in voice services and less than a third in broadband services, for 
LLU. To the extent that promoting competition through the unbundling of 
access infrastructure is seen as necessary, the mobile operators, which 
collectively cover 90 percent of the voice market and 66 percent of the 
broadband market, should also be part of this kind of regulation” (Perry, 
2011). 
 
Numerous further examples exist. ICASA does not engage. The private 
sector players do not publicly engage each other. Statements and 
viewpoints are not meaningfully substantiated. Nothing that could be 
considered engaged debate happens, short of when submissions are 
made and public hearings held, when all the relevant parties make their 
respective points. ICASA takes note, or not, and then releases 
documentation accordingly. Should industry disagree with a given 
outcome, this is then taken up through other channels, including ICASA's 
Complaints and Compliance Commission, the Competition Commission, 
the Competition Tribunal and the courts should the public consultation 
process have been concluded.  
 
No research exists to provide more insight into the lack of debate and 
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superficiality of the local discourse on the matter. This lack of meaningful 
debate, and lack of a substantial theoretical foundation means that views 
on LLU, its impact, its effects, the complexities and consequences of its 
implementation, and views on its appropriateness, or not for the local 
market are all roughly where they were when the process started – eight 
years ago in 2005. 
 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 differ in some respects with the 
literature presented in contrast. The findings provide a summary of what 
the industry believes LLU is, what it can do, and where the challenges lie 
in its implementation. Compare that to the literature and there are definite 
points of disagreement. This suggests that either the literature is incorrect, 
or a number of the respondents and stakeholders do not necessarily have 
an indepth or expert grasp of LLU and all of its implications and 
complexities.  
 
One could almost conclude that in South Africa a flawed policy document 
(the Marwala Report) is being used by an ill-equipped regulator, informed 
by an industry which does not necessarily have an expert view on the 
matter, to determine how LLU should take place in a market where it is not 
clear that it will make any substantial impact. 
5.2 Towards a framework for LLU 
In conducting this research and analysing the results the researcher made 
the following discovery: Each type of unbundling has variable costs for the 
incumbent and the new entrant, gives the new entrant and incumbent 
varying levels of control and is complex to a great or lesser degree for 
incumbents, new entrants and the regulator. This can be illustrated by the 
below diagram, created by the researcher: 
 
Figure 3: LLU Cost, complexity, control diagram 
 
   Cost                         Subscriber  
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Simply put, the closer to the subscriber the loop is unbundled, the higher 
the cost for either the incumbent, the new entrant or both, the greater the 
complexity for incumbent, entrant and regulator, and the more control 
given to the entrant/alternate carrier. The reasons for this cost and 
complexity are outlined briefly below.  
 
Full unbundling takes place at the DSLAM (ie the exchange), and gives 
new entrants/alternate carriers the most control and the opportunity to 
install and utilise new technology (either in the incumbent's exchange, at 
an appropriate co-location facility, or at the street box). As such, it enables 
the introduction of innovative products and services. Full unbundling is 
complex and complicated, but serves to make the entire circuit available to 
other players. It is the opinion of the research participants that full 
unbundling will have the biggest impact because of the scope of access 
given to alternate carriers.  
 
Full unbundling requires substantial investment from the new entrant, 
which has to do everything a fully-fledged telco would have to do to 
operate a profitable business, except lay and maintain the copper cable 
loop. The incumbent has to invest in order to make unbundling workable, 
including reworking business models to accommodate the rental income 
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from other carriers on copper circuits, plus paying ongoing maintenance 
costs, and compensating for the loss of the revenue it would have derived 
had it retained the unbundled loops. 
 
Sub-loop unbundling happens at the closest possible point to the 
consumer, as it gives the facilities seeker access to the local loop from the 
street box. Street boxes typically do not have space in them so the new 
entrant would need to invest in that infrastructure as well as investing in its 
own backhaul from there to its own exchange facilities.  
  
Line-sharing gives the new entrant access to the high-frequency portion of 
the line for the provision of data services, while the incumbent retains the 
low-frequency portion for the supply of voice services. This functional split  
takes place at the exchange (DSLAM). Control of the infrastructure is 
retained by the incumbent. Line-sharing is reasonably complex but 
requires less investment from both incumbents and new entrants than full 
or sub-loop unbundling but it still requires the new entrant to invest in the 
infrastructure to reach the incumbent's customer base (billing, marketing, 
systems, etc), backhaul infrastructure, and likewise requires investment 
from the incumbent to render it workable (as do all forms of LLU). Line-
sharing allows the incumbent to retain voice revenues, as well as derive 
rental from new entrants for the other portion of the line. 
 
Bitstream, as mentioned, isn't a physical unbundling or a facilities share 
but rather a wholesale access product. It opens the incumbent's network 
to new entrants at minimal cost and allows new entrants to provide data 
services to consumers. It takes place at the furthest point from the 
consumer and the capital expenditure requirement is significantly reduced, 
as is control over the product.  
5.2.2 Formulating a definition of LLU 
Given the research responses, literature reviewed, and the main 
theoretical foundation (Hausman & Sidak, 2005), LLU can be defined as 
follows: LLU is a policy intervention. It recognises that an incumbent 
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telecommunications operator has a dominant position in its market as a 
result of years of monopoly provision of services to that market and sole 
access to and control over the local loop (also referred to as the last mile) 
that links the telecommunications company to its customers. It is based on 
the premise that regulatory intervention is required to enable new entrants 
to challenge this dominance as it is not economically feasible to duplicate 
the local loop and, as such, competition will not result without policy and 
regulatory intervention. LLU enables competing operators to access the 
incumbent's loop, for a fee, and provide services to consumers using said 
loop. The incumbent is thus deprived of an opportunity to derive retail 
revenue from an unbundled loop, while it retains responsibility for 
maintaining that loop (OECD (2003); Baranes & Bourreau (2005); LLU 
Committee (2007); Bachiocchi, Florio & Gambio (2007)).  
5.2.3 Identifying the types of LLU 
There are four types of LLU – full unbundling, sub-loop unbundling, line 
sharing and bitstream. 
On the basis of all of the above, we can define the various types of LLU as 
follows: 
 
Full unbundling happens when the incumbent's copper is leased to a new 
entrant which can then utilise it to provide a full range of voice and data 
telecommunications services. The incumbent ceases to provide services 
but still owns the infrastructure and has to maintain it (OECD, 2003).   
 
Sub-loop unbundling happens when the entrant connects to a point in the 
local loop (usually at the primacy connection point or street cabinet) on a 
full or shared basis. This is best suited to fibre to the curb environments 
where high-speed bandwidth connections are being provided 
(Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad & Tobago, 2009, p15). It 
requires investment from the entrant in back haul connectivity, street 
boxes, and the rest of the normal infrastructure required by a 
telecommunications company (as do all four types). 
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Line-sharing gives the new entrant access to some of the copper pair so, 
for example, the incumbent offers voice and the entrant offers broadband 
to the same consumer over the same (shared) line (OECD, 2003). This 
requires less investment from the new entrant than full or sub-loop 
unbundling, and allows the incumbent to retain voice revenues on the line.  
 
Bitstream gives entrants a wholesale xDSL product that they can resell to 
consumers – full control of the lines is retained by the incumbent (OECD, 
2003). Bitstream opens the incumbent's network to new entrants at 
minimal cost and allows new entrants to provide data services to 
consumers. It takes place at the furthest point from the consumer and the 
capital expenditure requirement is significantly reduced, as is control over 
the product. 
5.2.4 Stating the rationales for LLU  
There are four rationales for LLU, according to Hausman and Sidak (2005, 
p173). 
 
Rationale one – LLU removes entry barriers to platform competition, state 
Hausman and Sidak (2005). This rationale did not receive much comment 
or input from the respondents in this study because it is not relevant in the 
South African context, where cable television does not exist so telephony 
competition via cable networks is not a possibility. 
 
Rationale two – “competition in retail markets cannot be achieved without 
mandatory unbundling”, according to Hausman and Sidak (2005), Intven 
(2000) and respondents to this study. LLU gives new entrants access to 
the incumbents loop to provide services without investing in infrastructure 
themselves (Sutherland (2007); ITU InfoDev (2010)). This is also part of 
the essential facilities doctrine (Gabelmann, 2001), which states that the 
local loop is an essential facility that cannot be easily duplicated.  
 
Rationale three – “mandatory unbundling enables future facilities-based 
investment („stepping-stone‟ or „ladder of investment‟ hypothesis)” 
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according to Hausman and Sidak (2005) and research respondents. 
However, while the respondents state it as a matter of fact, Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) state that the validity of the hypothesis is not confirmed in 
practice.  
 
Rationale four – “competition in wholesale access markets is desirable”, 
according to Hausman and Sidak (2005) and LLU will result in wholesale 
access competition, according to the research respondents. 
5.2.6 Considering the Impact of LLU on competition 
There are four types of competition - retail competition, platform 
competition, facilities-based competition and wholesale competition, 
according to Hausman and Sidak (2005). 
 
The researcher, as per the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), understands 
that there is an inter-relationship between LLU and competition: that a 
specific definition of LLU, paired with a stated rationale for LLU, paired 
with a specific type of unbundling will result in a specific type of 
competition (Hausman & Sidak, 2005, as adapted). 
 
Competition is by and large considered to be the de facto outcome of a 
LLU exercise, and the impact on competition is thus expected to be high. 
The participants in the study as well as those that contributed input into the 
documentary sources certainly seem to think so. The academic literature 
is divided in its view.  
5.2.6.1 Retail competition 
Access to the copper loop itself needs to be priced correctly if LLU is to 
drive retail competition, as Baranes and Bourreau (2005) note. Input costs 
(ie cost to the operator) that enter the value chain at wholesale (operator 
to operator) level drive retail costs. Thus if access to the local loop is 
priced too high, new entrants will not have any commercial motivation to 
take up unbundled loops and use them to offer alternative services.  
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This means the regulator needs to be in a position to set and enforce 
pricing on unbundled loops that gives the incumbent a reasonable return 
(it would not be fair to pay the incumbent less than fair value for its 
infrastructure), allows a reasonable profit margin for new entrants, and will 
thus ensure a retail price that consumers will find both acceptable and 
affordable (or they will not use said services). 
 
The various costs of the different types of unbundling will impact retail 
competition – both the scope and scale. The higher the investment 
required by incumbent and entrant, the higher the retail price will be. Full 
unbundling, for example, requires substantial investment, which few 
operators in the South African market, for example, have the financial 
resources to make.  
 
Should the regulator want to encourage many competitors in the sector, 
full unbundling would likely not achieve that aim, whereas bitstream, 
considerably cheaper for both incumbent and new entrants, has greater 
potential to do so.  
 
Retail competition is considered to be a good thing because it is believed 
to be a driver of innovation. According to Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
however, LLU resulted in a decrease in investment in the local loop by 
incumbents. This likelihood was raised by the research respondents too, 
and is an important consideration for policymakers. Further, full unbundling 
is the only type of unbundling that enables new entrants to invest 
meaningfully in technology and thus be able to innovate on that basis.  
 
The respondents to this study also consider that retail competition will 
occur without the imposition of mandatory unbundling, a position 
supported by the competition in the mobile cellular and Internet services 
provision retail markets. While the question of whether the mobile local 
loop is a viable substitute for the fixed-line local loop is a long, complicated 
argument that is beyond the scope of this research paper, it must be noted 
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that both voice and data competition exists in the retail space in South 
Africa because of mobile and wireless products and services, as well as 
the ADSL products the incumbent makes available to its competitors. 
 
If driving retail competition is the sole purpose of an unbundling exercise, 
policymakers and regulators could consider alternative interventions that 
may result in the same outcome without the disadvantages of being as 
costly and complex as LLU implementations typically are. Such 
interventions include adopting regulatory policies that enable operators to 
roll out networks using any technology, and to target any market segment 
that they can make a profit out of targeting, or making scarce resources 
like frequency spectrum available to foster wholesale competition.  
5.2.6.2 Platform-based competition 
Platform-based competition is inhibited without LLU, or so the theory goes, 
comment Hausman and Sidak (2005). While this type of competition could 
not arise in the local market as there is no cable network to unbundle, as 
previously noted, Hausman and Sidak (2005) observe that if platform-
based competition was impossible without LLU then new cable, wireless 
or other providers would not have arisen in the markets the authors' study 
covered. 
5.2.6.3 Facilities-based competition 
Facilities-based competition is often the ultimate long term goal of LLU 
interventions, as facilities-based competition, according to Oftel (as cited 
by Bourreau and Doğan (2005: p174)), provides the needed level of 
innovation and product diversity to meet consumer needs. 
 
As a prelude to this roll out, LLU provides a gap in which the new entrant 
can provide services to generate income to use to invest in a network. 
They say this often doesn't happen, however, due to the pricing of the 
access loop, which results in delays in rolling out networks and new 
entrants falling behind, technologically speaking.  
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LLU tends to disincentivise entrants from rolling out their own 
infrastructure, as noted by Bourreau and Doğan (2005) and De Bijl and 
Peitz (2004). As shown by MWeb, which offers an uncapped ADSL 
service, however, product innovation is possible even with a bitstream 
service, which gives very little control to entrants/alternate carriers.  
 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) found no evidence in their five country case 
studies to support the assertion that LLU leads to facilities-based 
competition. Possibly, they note, due to factors that the regulators had not 
anticipated. Regulation, in a dynamic market, the authors say, impacts the 
returns on investment in network infrastructure by new entrants and 
incumbents, and risks reducing it because incumbents are forced to let 
new entrants use their infrastructure, and new entrants have no motivation 
to build out their own infrastructure while they have access to the 
incumbent's. 
5.2.6.4 Wholesale competition 
According to the accepted theory, LLU will promote wholesale competition, 
as Hausman and Sidak (2005) state. New entrants building their own 
facilities means new players entering the market in the future would not be 
solely reliant on incumbents' unbundled network elements, while 
simultaneously resulting in lower pricing of said elements, which would 
theoretically result in lower prices for consumers. The case studies 
conducted by Hausman and Sidak (2005) revealed some form (albeit very 
slight in one case) of wholesale competition had arisen in three of the 
countries, while it had not in the other two, but that there was a lack of 
wholesale players in those markets. Hausman and Sidak (2005) consider 
that the economic theory disproves this rationale - if wholesale was a 
viable market segment, they argue, players would have arisen.  
5.2.7 Considering the impact of LLU on the incumbent, new entrants 
and consumers 
The impact on the incumbent, new entrants and consumers is variable – 
depending on the type of unbundling implemented (or how many of the 
four types are rolled out). As outlined below, different types of unbundling 
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require different things from the regulator, incumbent and new entrants, 
and will accordingly affect the consumer in a variety of ways.  
 
The respondents to the research all consider LLU to be a means to offer 
lower prices, a wider variety of services, and more innovative products and 
services to consumers, and thus it can be concluded they deem the impact 
to be high.  
 
Retail pricing, an indicator of increased retail competition, increased in four 
out of five country case studies conducted by Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
however, and declined in only one – the German market. 
 
LLU is further considered by the respondents in this study to be essential 
to new entrants successfully entering a market. That South Africa's second 
network operator has fared badly, in the absence of LLU, is apparent. How 
much better it would have fared had LLU been implemented much earlier, 
or had it been allowed access to Telkom's network after it was licensed as 
was originally planned, is a matter for debate, or perhaps another research 
study. 
 
Some respondents consider LLU to herald a death knell for the incumbent 
- including in this instance the incumbent itself, judging from its submission 
to ICASA (Telkom, 2011) and general reaction to the LLU process. Others 
believe that it will give the incumbent a new source of revenue and result 
in full utilisation of a currently under-utilised local loop.  
 
Bourreau and Doğan (2005), comment that incumbent operators are 
incentivised to price local loops below cost in order to encourage new 
entrants to use said loops and only compete on a services basis, and not 
on a facilities basis.  
 
De Bijl and Peitz (2004) also note that LLU tends to disincentivise entrants 
from rolling out their own infrastructure. Here the cost of unbundled loops 
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is a factor – as stated previously, new entrants have no incentive to roll out 
their own infrastructure if they can utilise someone else's at an acceptable 
price. The challenge here is for the regulator to manage the pricing of local 
loops in such a way that new entrants are incentivised to roll out their own 
infrastructure over time. De Bijl and Peitz (2004) suggest withdrawing LLU 
once competition has matured as a means to do this. 
 
Another strategy may be for the regulator to only enable some types of 
unbundling, for example sub-loop unbundling and line-sharing, which 
enable broadband services to be rolled out but are not attractive enough to 
discourage ongoing network roll out. Network roll out is important because 
increasing broadband penetration is a major factor in many countries 
today, and particularly in developing markets. Both sub-loop unbundling 
and line-sharing have specific drawbacks in terms of the cost, complexity, 
and control each involves, as outlined in the LLU Cost, Complexity and 
Control diagram, that make them less than ideal without rendering them 
totally unattractive to operators, for example those that do not have the 
resources to invest in fully unbundled loops.  
 
In South Africa in particular, many operators have already started rolling 
out their own infrastructure. The regulator will want to encourage this, 
while continuing to liberalise this last section of the market that is still 
subject to monopoly control. Implementing less than ideal types of 
unbundling will enable these operators to take advantage of the 
opportunity to offer different and more diverse products and services over 
Telkom's infrastructure while roll outs are underway. What the fate of the 
local loop will be once those roll outs are complete and the market 
becomes significantly more competitive has not been studied, but 
respondents to this research considered it likely it will fall into disuse 
without LLU driving increased use of the network. 
 
Respondents to this research commented that LLU will result in a 
deepening of the incumbent's copper network in terms of subscribers, 
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volumes and products. They believe this is likely because making the loop 
available to other operators to provide innovative products and services 
over will likely result in increased use of the loop, resulting in more 
demand, which will then drive expansion of the copper network.  
 
As de Bijl and Peitz (2005) noted, unbundled loops have been used to 
offer broadband services (by incumbents and entrants alike). This is 
important for regulators who fear incumbents will be driven out of business 
by LLU and other competitive measures. Certainly the respondents to this 
study considered LLU to offer a lifeline to the copper access network, 
which has shrunk from 4,9m lines in 2002 to 4,1m lines in 2011 (Creamer 
Media Research Unit (2010); Telkom (2011)), and is continuing to decline 
annually. 
 
LLU was originally posited as a means to create competition in the fixed 
line market. Technology has advanced, and voice services are increasingly 
the domain of mobile cellular operators, and VoIP providers, which supply 
voice services over data connections.  
 
As Bijl and Peitz (2005) comment, while full unbundling hasn't achieved its 
aims, line sharing and bitstream unbundling initiatives have overall been 
relatively successful in introducing competition in the voice arena, not 
necessarily via fixed lines though, but rather via newer technologies like 
voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and in introducing competition in the 
Internet access space. 
 
Bourreau and Doğan (2005) note that LLU has shown itself to be both 
complicated and slow in both the US and the EU, where it has been 
mandated since 1996 and 2001 respectively. Regulators and policymakers 
attempting to unbundle the local loop to drive voice competition should, as 
such, possibly be looking elsewhere. The time taken to unbundle the local 
loop means that the market will almost certainly have moved on, and 
found a way around the fixed line obstacle (as South Africa's has) before 
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LLU can show any real returns. But, the LLU process continues in South 
Africa, regardless, and in other territories like the EU where it is mandated. 
This framework for LLU is intended to be of use in South Africa and 
possibly of use to other countries facing an unbundling exercise. 
 
Several participants in the primary research process noted that a clear 
objective, coupled with an economic analysis and clear rationale for LLU 
are critical. Yet South Africa's initiative has started and gone some way 
towards completion with neither a clear objective nor an economic 
analysis, the rationale for unbundling this country's local loop is also not 
clear.  
5.3 Perry's LLU Analytical Framework 
A given definition of LLU plus a stated rationale for LLU plus a desired 
form of competition informed by the cost, complexity and control factors 
that each type of unbundling involves will enable policymakers to select 
the type of LLU most likely to result in the type of competition desired in a 
given market.  
 
Or, more simply put: (rationale for y + type of competition desired)/(cost, 
complexity, control factors of each type) = likelihood of success 
 
As a general rule, policymakers and regulators need to consider several 
factors when it comes to LLU.  
 
Firstly, the more expensive the type of LLU, the fewer players are likely to 
be able to afford it and it will result in a higher burden on the incumbent.  
 
Secondly, the more complex the type of LLU to implement, the higher the 
level of skills and resources required by the new entrant and incumbent 
and the higher the regulatory overhead and the more crucial the need for 
the regulator to be accordingly expert and well-resourced.  
 
Lastly, the more control a type of LLU gives to new entrants, the more cost 
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and more complexity is involved, but, more control also equals more 
opportunity to install new technologies and innovate in product and 
services offerings. 
 
The regulator or policymaker thus needs to go back to the rationale for 
unbundling, or the objective of the unbundling exercise, and map the 
relevant factors outlined above, to establish the likelihood of a desired type 
of competition resulting from an unbundling exercise. 
 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter the researcher has presented a framework for LLU that can 
be used by policymakers and regulators to guide their own LLU 
approaches and implementations.  
 
The researcher has defined LLU, identified the four types of LLU, stated 
the four rationales for LLU, and considered the impact on the four types of 
competition that will likely result from an LLU implementation.  
 
The researcher has proceeded on the basis that an inter-relationship 
between LLU and competition: that a specific definition of LLU, paired with 
a stated rationale for LLU, paired with a specific type of unbundling will 
result in a specific type of competition (Hausman and Sidak, 2005) .  
The researcher has analysed the input provided by the research 
respondents and the documentary sources within the parameters outlined 
by Hausman and Sidak (2005) to compile this framework.  
In studying the above the researcher has identified three characteristics 
common to all four types of unbundling – control, cost and complexity - 
each of which is variable depending on the type of unbundling, and will 
accordingly have an impact on the outcome of an implementation.  
The researcher has also provided the means to link the characteristics of 
the different types of LLU with the rationales for LLU and types of 
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competition that result so that regulators and policymakers can plot the 
variables relevant to their situation and select a type of LLU most likely to 
be successfully implemented given their situation and desired outcome. 
The means to link these variables has been presented in a framework - 
called Perry's LLU Analytical Framework. 
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Chapter 6 Utilising Perry's Analytical Framework on a case 
by case basis 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher provides a brief overview of the state of the 
telecommunications market in South Africa, along with some comments on 
possible areas of future research. Hausman and Sidak's model is 
evaluated, particularly in reference to its usefulness in analysing the local 
market. Some adaptations are suggested. The researcher presents the 
model she has developed based on the amended Hausman and Sidak 
(2005) model and the LLU Cost, complexity, control diagram she 
developed alongside some brief commentary on the framework and its 
intended purpose and possible insights further research could provide.  
6.2 The state of the telecoms sector in South Africa 
South Africa has an estimated 4.1m copper lines (Telkom, 2011), to a 
population of 51.8m people (Deloitte, 2013). Copper line penetration has 
steadily declined over the past seven years with Telkom reporting 4,752m 
lines in 2005 (MyBroadband, 2011). Internet penetration remains low, with 
an estimated 8.5 million subscribers in 2012 (World Wide Worx, 2012). 
The researcher has compiled the below snapshot (Table 3) of the 
consumer access market using the publicly available data cited above and 
below. 
Table 3: The South African Consumer Access Market 
 
Total population 51.8m 
Fixed line subscribers 4.1m 
Mobile subscribers 40.7m 
ADSL users 548 015 
Internet users 8.5m 
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Telecommunications prices remain high (Comninos, et al, 2010), and there 
is a need for increased competition to drive down pricing. The landing of 
the Seacom and Eassy cables has reduced wholesale prices but national 
backbone access is still expensive. 
 
Telkom has been offering broadband ADSL to its customers, and to other 
providers, since 2002, and it is available on 93 percent of the operator's 
network (Telkom, 2009). According to its 2009 annual report, Telkom had 
548 015 ADSL subscribers, an insignificant number given the size of the 
population. High pricing and limited availability remain a problem, due to 
lack of competition in this sphere of the market.  
 
South Africa has 66.1 million active SIM cards, 40.7 million mobile users 
and 128% mobile penetration (Deloitte, 2013). 
 
The introduction of fixed line competition has been unsuccessful, however, 
with the SNO, Neotel, not having achieved significant market penetration.  
 
The second network operator and wireless voice and data 
communications notwithstanding, the local loop remains the sole preserve 
of Telkom, and there is no competition for the provision of fixed-line 
services to businesses or consumers.  
 
Operators today offer fixed-wireless access on the CDMA-2000 standard 
(Neotel) and WiMax (Neotel, iBurst, Vodacom), and mobile access via 
UMTS (3G), HSPA+ 900/2100 (Cell C) and EDGE (MTN, Vodacom, Cell 
C) and telecommunications services uptake has progressed, as detailed 
above, mainly in the mobile arena. Both Vodacom and MTN are trialling so 
called 4G (LTE) services. They say they are waiting for spectrum and 
devices before rolling out commercially. 
 
There is no competition in the fixed line arena, and as the requirement for 
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faster and more reliable bandwidth increases, this will become increasingly 
problematic as wireless protocols do still not allow for the same 
bandwidths as wired, and are negatively affected by bad weather. 
 
The licensing of frequency spectrum aimed at enabling operators to offer 
LTE, or 4G services was postponed in 2010 but is expected to take place 
in 2013.  
 
As outlined in chapter one of this research, and as the Internet Service 
Providers Association notes in its submission (ISPA, 2011) on ICASA's 
Local Loop Unbundling Discussion Paper (ICASA, 2011), international 
peering and transit is highly competitive, international submarine 
connectivity is becoming increasingly so and national long distance 
connectivity is improving (although supply is still constrained and pricing 
thus distorted) thanks to several ongoing roll outs. The metropolitan 
backbone remains dominated by Telkom but self-provisioning is easing 
this. Only the last mile is still problematic, due to the infrastructure being 
owned and operated by a single provider (fixed) or group of providers 
(mobile). LLU is intended to relieve this last bottleneck, yet the results of 
this research suggest that it is not at all certain that it will do so. 
  
Says ISPA (2011): “The lack of progress in opening up the local loop to 
competition has been exacerbated by the lengthy delays experienced in 
the issuing of new licences for radio frequency spectrum suitable for the 
deployment of access networks.”  
 
There are other options available to regulators, which can be implemented 
more quickly, with more predictable results and with far less complexity – 
like spectrum allocations, as highlighted above by ISPA (2011). Several 
research respondents noted that if LLU does not happen in South Africa 
soon technology will have overtaken it, making the time period needed to 
do a full and proper LLU implementation even more of an issue. That no 
market study has been done, and thus no-one can comprehensively say 
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what state the market was in when LLU was first posited, what state it is in 
now and what the likely impact of LLU will be is further argument against 
an uninformed unbundling exercise. This requires further research.  
6.3 Reflections on Hausman and Sidak (2005) 
Hausman and Sidak (2005) consider the matter of whether or not LLU 
interventions achieved what they were intended to do by putting together a 
model that states that each of the four major rationales for LLU can be 
proven or disproven through empirical testing.  
 
They evaluate five countries' implementations of LLU (or lack of 
unbundling in the case of New Zealand), against each expected outcome 
based on the four stated rationales. They do not evaluate whether each 
implementation achieved the aims the regulatory authorities had in mind, 
however.  
 
This is important not only because the desired outcome may not have 
been one of the four stated rationales, but because the success or not of 
any LLU initiative is very difficult to gauge due to the sheer volume of 
economic and competitive factors at play.  
 
Several of Hausman and Sidak's (2005) conclusions state that it is 
uncertain whether or not LLU was responsible for a specific price reduction 
or market entry etc, because of the presence of other variables that could 
well have resulted in the same outcome. Evaluating against the regulator's 
desired outcome, in addition to the major rationales, would have provided 
valuable context within which to view the data presented by the two. 
 
They further do not consider time as a variable. One of the aims of LLU is 
to enable new entrants to utilise the incumbent's infrastructure so they can 
begin to generate revenue without incurring the enormous expense 
associated with rolling out a network (plus associated supporting 
infrastructure), as noted by Gabelman (2001) and Intven (2000) among 
others.  
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A LLU exercise needs to happen either before or at the same time as new 
entrants are licensed in order to enable said entrants to benefit. 
Unbundling the local loop years after new entrants have been licensed and 
begun operating, as is happening in South Africa, must have an impact on 
the success or failure of the implementation. The matter has not been 
researched, but this could have had an impact on the second network 
operator in South Africa, which has performed badly since it was launched. 
 
The Hausman and Sidak (2005) model is a very useful as a framework for 
studying the South African market, as it highlights the short-comings in the 
approach taken by South Africa's regulator. The regulator has not stated a 
desired rationale for LLU, although the desire to stimulate retail 
competition is heavily emphasised in the documentation on the matter 
(Local Loop Unbundling Committee Report (2007); ICASA, 2011a & b). 
The regulator has also not stated a desired outcome of an unbundling 
exercise. Again, retail competition is frequently mentioned Local Loop 
Unbundling Committee Report (2007); ICASA, 2011a & b). There is also a 
the lack of critical examination of the types of LLU and the types of 
competition that can result. Hausman and Sidak (2005) outline these 
clearly, and it offers a stark contrast to the approach taken in South Africa 
thus far. 
 
That said, the model would be even more useful had the variable of time 
taken and stated desired outcome been included. 
6.4 Taking Perry's LLU Analytical Framework further 
Perry's LLU Analytical Framework - A given definition of LLU plus a 
stated rationale for LLU plus a desired form of competition informed by the 
cost, complexity and control factors that each type of unbundling involves 
will enable policymakers to select the type of LLU most likely to result in 
the type of competition desired in a given market.  
 
Or: (rationale for y + type of competition desired)/(cost, complexity, control 
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factors of each type) = likelihood of success 
 
Perry's LLU Analytical Framework is based on the adapted Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) model presented in Chapter 2, and the LLU Cost, complexity, 
control diagram, presented in Chapter 5. The framework has come from 
the documentary analysis and interviews conducted over the course of this 
study and is intended to simply illustrate what policymakers and regulators 
need to consider when embarking on a local loop unbundling exercise.  
 
The success of any LLU implementation seems to be based on, and 
subject to, so many variables that it is impossible to state that if an 
unbundling exercise is successful in a market, or even a segment of a 
market, it will be successful in any other market.  
 
Policymakers and regulators face significant challenges in ensuring that 
policy and regulation act as enablers in their markets, and meet the needs 
of a sector that moves increasingly quickly, leaving regulators and 
policymakers scrambling to keep up. This is particularly true in developing 
countries where there is a lack of resources, a lack of expert regulatory 
skill and a lack of research that could be used to guide initiatives. This is 
important because it means that each policy intervention is almost starting 
from scratch, and cannot take into account the lessons learnt in other 
developing markets, because these have not been adequately 
documented, studied and analysed.  
 
Perry's LLU Analytical Framework is intended to be an resource for 
policymakers and regulators. By taking the combined academic literature, 
documentary sources and expert input into account it is designed to be a 
tool that can be used quickly and efficiently to aid decision-making. Its 
usefulness remains to be seen, as does its relevance in markets other 
than South Africa's. To that end, if it is applied locally or elsewhere, a study 
on that application and its results would be useful.   
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 Appendix A: Respondents 
Requests sent to: 
 
Internet Service Providers Association 
MTN 
ICASA 
MWeb 
Neotel 
Telkom 
LINK Centre 
Vodacom 
My Broadband 
Vodacom 
Cell C 
Vox Telecom 
Internet Solutions  
Africa Analysis 
 
Participated in round one – questionnaires: 
 
Neotel 
Internet Service Providers Association 
MWeb 
My Broadband 
Cell C 
Vox Telecom 
Internet Solutions 
 
Participated in round two - interviews: 
 
Internet Service Providers Association 
MTN 
ICASA 
LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand 
Vodacom 
My Broadband 
Cell C 
Vox Telecom 
Africa Analysis 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
Masters Research Paper: The impact of local loop unbundling on competition and 
the implications for policymakers 
 
Please answer yes or no to each of the below and return to 
samantha.perry@gmail.com – many thanks! 
 
Name:   
Position:   
Company:   
 
Questionnaire:  
1. Will competition in retail markets be achieved without unbundling the local 
loop?  
2. Will mandatory unbundling promote wholesale access competition? 
3. Will mandatory unbundling promote retail competition?  
4. Will mandatory unbundling promote platform-based competition?  
5. Will mandatory unbundling promote facilities-based competition?  
6. Will local loop unbundling result in lower prices for consumers?  
7. Will local loop unbundling result in lower prices for new entrants?  
8. Will unbundling the local loop encourage new players to enter the market and 
begin rolling out their own infrastructure? 
9. Will bitstream unbundling result in wholesale access competition?  
10. Will bitstream unbundling result in retail competition? 
11. Will bitstream unbundling result in platform-based competition?  
12. Will bitstream unbundling result in facilities-based competition? 
13. Will line-sharing result in wholesale access competition? 
14. Will line-sharing result in retail competition? 
15. Will line-sharing result in platform-based competition? 
16. Will line-sharing result in facilities-based competition? 
17. Will full unbundling result in wholesale access competition? 
18. Will full unbundling result in retail competition? 
19. Will full unbundling result in platform-based competition? 
20. Will full unbundling result in facilities-based competition? 
21. Will sub-loop unbundling result in wholesale access competition? 
22. Will sub-loop unbundling result in retail competition? 
23. Will sub-loop unbundling result in platform-based competition?  
24. Will sub-loop unbundling result in facilities-based competition?  
 
Definitions: 
Bitstream – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the incumbent gives entrants 
a wholesale xDSL product that they can resell to consumers – full control of the 
lines is retained by the incumbent (OECD, 2003, p7,8). 
 
Entrant – a company entering an industry. In this context, entering an industry 
dominated by a monopoly incumbent. 
 
Facilities-based competition - is used in the telecommunications industry to 
describe competition between providers of the same or similar services, but 
where the service is delivered by different or proprietary means or networks. For 
example a broadband over powerline provider competing with a cable TV 
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network to provide broadband Internet service is considered to be facilities-based 
competition. Also called infrastructure-based competition. (Webopedia) 
 
Full unbundling – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the incumbent's copper 
is leased to a new entrant to offer services over, and the incumbent ceases to 
provide services but still owns the infrastructure and has to maintain it (OECD, 
2003, p7,8). 
 
Incumbent – a monopoly provider of services in an industry, in this case 
telecommunications. Often put in place and subsidised by a country's 
government in an industry where it was thought it would not be feasible to have 
more than one player (so called natural monopoly industries) like transport, 
utilities and such.  
 
Line sharing – a type of local loop unbundling whereby the new entrant is 
afforded access to some of the copper pair so, for example, the incumbent offers 
voice and the entrant offers broadband to the same consumer over the same 
(shared) line. (OECD, 2003, p7,8) 
 
Local loop unbundling – is a policy intervention intended to make the last mile of 
copper wire between a telecommunications exchange and a consumer available 
to telecommunications operators to offer services competing with those offered 
by the incumbent telecommunications company, which owns the infrastructure. 
 
Retail market – where providers sell services to end-consumers. 
 
Service-based competition – competition between providers where each provides 
services using the same infrastructure, for example, where a local loop has been 
unbundled and the incumbent and entrant are both using copper wire to provide 
voice services, or, “when the entrant uses the facilities of the incumbent, 
competition is called service-based and can be realised either through resale or 
through unbundling schemes” (Bourreau, Doğan, 2004, p289). 
 
Sub-loop unbundling – where the entrant connects to a point in the local loop 
(usually at the primacy connection point or street cabinet) on a full or shared 
basis. Best suited to fibre to the curb environments where high-speed bandwidth 
connections are being provided. (Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and 
Tobago, 2009, p15) 
 
Wholesale access services – services provided to a company for resale, for 
example, bitstream access provided to an entrant by an incumbent to enable the 
entrant to resell said services to consumers.
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Appendix C: Information Sheet, Consent Form and 
Interview Questions 
  
Information Sheet: 
 
Masters Research Report: Local loop unbundling and  
competition in South Africa 
 
Dear Key Participant 
 
You are invited to take part in this research study. Before you decide whether 
or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information 
carefully. 
 
Background & Overview of the study 
 
This study is being conducted by Samantha Perry in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for a Masters of Management in ICT Policy and Regulation at 
the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the 
University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
The study investigates local loop unbundling as a policy intervention in the 
electronic communications sector. 
 
South Africa's telecommunications market is still lacking effective competition 
in the fixed line segment, despite government efforts to liberalise. One of the 
policy interventions aimed at remedying this is local loop unbundling – a 
process whereby the last mile of copper wire between a telecommunications 
exchange and a consumer is made available to telecommunications 
operators to offer services competing with those offered by the incumbent 
telecommunications company, which owns the infrastructure. Local loop 
unbundling has been implemented worldwide by a significant number of 
countries since it was first posited in the 1980s.  
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This research will draw on a model developed by Hausman and Sidak (2005), 
as well as on insights gained from interviews with players in the sector, and 
document analysis of submissions on local loop unbundling, to understand 
the policy and regulatory dimensions of local loop unbundling in the South 
African context. In order to do that, the researcher investigates local loop 
unbundling, the competition landscape and the expected outcomes of an 
unbundling exercise in the local market, through primary and secondary 
research.  
 
The organisation and funding of the research 
 
Samantha Perry is a private student and the study is not being funded.  
 
Deciding whether to participate 
 
Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary. If you do decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. 
 
There are no risks in participating in this interview although you may be 
inconvenienced by taking time out of your busy schedule to be interviewed. 
There will be no direct monetary benefit to you for your participation. 
However, the study may have several beneficial outcomes. In particular, it will 
further our understanding of the topic and contribute to the knowledge in the 
field.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
Any personal information collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. 
Identifiers will be removed from the data when the research findings are 
consolidated into a report and will not be included in any subsequent 
publications. The anonymised data generated in the course of the research 
will be kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period of five years after 
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the completion of a research project. It may be used for further research and 
analysis. 
 
Research Ethics 
 
If you have concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your 
rights as a research participant in this study, you may contact Luci Abrahams, 
see contact details below. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
 
Please contact the below for any further information you require pertaining to 
the study. 
 
Luci Abrahams 
Director, LINK Centre 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
luciennesa@gmail.com 
+27 82 569 7675 
  
Samantha Perry 
Student, LINK Centre 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
samantha.perry@gmail.com 
+27834145586 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet. 
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Consent Form: 
Masters Research Report: Local loop unbundling and competition in South 
Africa  
 
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study    
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
   
time, without giving reason. 
3. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using  
information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in  
this study will remain secure.        
  
 
Please tick box                Yes    
No 
 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded.     
           
5 I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications.    
            
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it 
has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used 
for future research.         
  
 
________________           __________                               ______________ 
Name of Participant   Date     Signature 
 
________________           __________                               ______________ 
Name of Researcher   Date     Signature 
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Semi-structured Interview Questions  
 
A. Introductory comments on local loop unbundling 
 
1. Do you believe the local loop should be unbundled, and if so/if not – 
why/why not? 
2. Do you believe that local loop unbundling (local loop unbundling) is an 
essential policy tool to promote competition in the South African electronic 
communications market? Why/why not? 
 
B. Types of unbundling and possible impact 
 
3. In which ways can local loop unbundling contribute to creating 
competition in the retail electronic communications market? 
4. What do you understand the term 'bitstream unbundling' to mean and 
what impact would it have? 
5. What do you understand the term 'full unbundling' to mean and what 
impact do you believe it will have? 
6. What do you understand the term 'sub-loop unbundling' to mean and 
what impact would it have? 
7. What do you understand the term 'line-sharing' to mean and what 
impact would it have? 
 
C. Affects of local loop unbundling on electronic communications 
ecosystem 
 
8. How would local loop unbundling affect the fixed line communications 
market? 
9. How would local loop unbundling affect the mobile communications 
market? 
10. How would local loop unbundling affect the Internet services provision 
market? 
11. How would local loop unbundling affect the electronic communications 
value chain as a whole? 
 
D. Comments on local loop unbundling policy and regulation 
 
12. What are your comments on the policy and regulatory processes for 
local loop unbundling to date? 
13. What impact do you believe the delays in unbundling the local loop will 
have on the success or failure of the exercise? 
 
 
Ends 
  
